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Abstract
Examining the Influence of Source-Message Incongruence on Source Trustworthiness and
Attitudes Regarding Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions
Lori Garner Manes
Claremont Graduate University: 2019
Research has shown that when a source proffers a message that is incongruent with its expected
position on a topic, it can have an effect on the perceived trustworthiness of the communicator,
the persuasiveness of the message, and the extent to which the receiver elaborates the message.
However, research in this area has not been consistent. Questions remain as to whether sourcemessage incongruence enhances source trustworthiness, attitude change, or both, relative to
source-message congruence. Focusing on an environmental risk management context involving
the cleanup of a hazardous waste site, this research investigated how source-message
incongruence influenced perceptions of source trustworthiness, attitude change, perceptions of
risk, and support for risk management decisions, as well as the extent to which respondents
elaborated the communicator’s message. Experiment 1 presented participants (N = 155) with
message either in favor of a Superfund designation for the hazardous waste site (proenvironmental message position) or in opposition to a Superfund designation (pro-business
message position). The source of the message was either the president of a local environmental
advocacy group (environmental source) or the cleanup project manager from the company
responsible for the contamination and cleanup (corporate source). Taking into account
participants’ reported levels of environmental concern and political ideology, results indicated
that incongruous messages for both sources were more effective in changing attitudes than
congruent messages. However, source trustworthiness increased only in the condition in which

`

the corporate source advocated an incongruent (pro-environmental) message position. When the
environmental source advocated an incongruent (pro-business) message position, perceptions of
trustworthiness significantly decreased. In a study similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 (N =
168) examined how source-message incongruence influenced participants’ cognitive elaboration,
while taking into account environmental concern, political ideology, and need for cognition. It
was expected that the incongruent source-message combinations would elicit significantly
different levels of cognitive elaboration than messages of sources advocating congruous
messages. Results found no significant interaction between source and message on cognitive
elaboration. Contrary to expectations, respondents in the two incongruent source-message
conditions did not differ significantly in self-reported cognitive elaboration compared to the two
congruent conditions. Unexpectedly, a main effect for message type emerged. Regardless of the
source, when the corporate message position was advocated, participants engaged in
significantly more cognitive elaboration than when the environmental message position was
advocated. Possible explanations for these results are discussed, as are implications for
environmental risk communication practitioners.
Keywords: environmental risk management, risk communication, source-message
incongruence, expectancy disconfirmation
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INTRODUCTION
Considerable research suggests that a source may be more persuasive when advocating a
position that is incongruous with its expected position on a given topic (Baker & Petty, 1994;
Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Koeske & Crano, 1968; Petty, Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein,
2001; Priester & Petty, 1995; Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams, 1966). The underlying assumption
of this effect is that when a source advocates an incongruent message, the recipient presumes that
the source is unbiased, more trustworthy, and therefore the message is more believable than
when a congruent message is advocated. In addition to being more persuasive, incongruent
source-message combinations have been shown to alter message processing (Baker & Petty,
1994; Hunt, Smith, & Kernan,1989; O’Brien & Myers, 1985; Wood and Eagly, 1981; Ziegler,
2010). However, the effects of source-message incongruence on post-message processing has
been inconclusive, with some studies suggesting that elaboration is increased with incongruence
(e.g., Eagly & Chaiken; Ziegler, Diehl, & Ruther, 2002), and others finding decreased
elaboration (e.g., Wood & Eagly, 1981) in cases of source-message incongruence.
The current research sought to test the ability of source-message incongruence to bolster
perceptions of source trustworthiness and foster attitude change, as well as to clarify the effects
of incongruence on the cognitive elaboration of messages, while taking into account personal
relevance and relevant demographic variables. An environmental risk management scenario
provided a novel context for the research. Environmental risk managers are tasked with
evaluating environmental risks, such as those that might exist at a hazardous waste site, and
making decisions about how to manage them in a manner that protects public health and the
environment. Despite being scientific experts, risk managers are generally viewed as
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untrustworthy (Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997; Slovic, 1999). Fiske and Dupree’s (2014)
research on the credibility of scientists as communicators suggests that although scientists and
engineers typically fulfill the expertise component of credibility and have the public’s respect,
they do not necessarily have their trust. Indeed, there is generally a low level of trust in
institutional risk managers. Moreover, a number of studies have shown that most federal and
state agencies are perceived as untrustworthy (see Chryssochoidis, Strada, & Krystallis, 2009 for
a review). This is a perplexing problem, as distrust is associated with increased perceptions of
risk, and has consistently been blamed for the failure of risk communication programs (Slovic,
1999). This dissertation sought to test the utility of social psychological research on source
credibility and trustworthiness, specifically the effects of source-message incongruence, in
enhancing the success of risk communication efforts by environmental risk managers. Although
social psychology literature on attitudes and attitude change literature has not been completely
ignored by risk communication scholars (e.g., Terpstra, 2011; Trumbo & McComas, 2008), Renn
and Levine (1991) pointed out that there has been “a fair amount of ignorance or negligence in
considering or applying the vast amount of research results from psychological or sociological
studies on the effectiveness of communication and on the role of trust and credibility” (p. 176).
This dissertation aims to fill this gap, one the author argues still exists to some degree today.
Overview of the Current Research
The first research question focuses on how congruent versus incongruent source-message
pairings impact attitudes, source trustworthiness, perceived risk, and support for risk
management. Study 1 sought to examine these questions. The general hypothesis was that
sources advocating messages that are incongruent with their expected positions will lead to more
attitude change, enhanced perceptions of source trustworthiness, reduce perceptions of risk, and
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increase support for risk management decisions, compared to sources that advocate messages
that are congruent with their expected positions.
The second research question, addressed in Study 2, extended the investigation by
examining the psychological processes behind the effects of source-message (in)congruence.
Source and message variables were manipulated to clarify the influence of source-message
incongruence on the cognitive elaboration of messages. The general hypothesis for Study 2 was
that incongruent source-message combinations (i.e., corporate source advocating environmental
congruent message and environmental activist advocating a business congruent message) would
lead to significantly different amounts of cognitive elaboration than congruent combinations,
however, no predictions were made as to the direction of the difference.
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CHAPTER ONE:
The Role of Source Credibility in Persuasion
For decades, social psychologists have been studying the persuasive effect of source
credibility and how it impacts attitudes and behavior. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953)
identified two components of source credibility: expertise and trustworthiness. Hovland and
colleagues define expertise as "the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of
valid assertions" (p. 21). In short, expertise is the extent to which an audience member perceives
that the communicator is knowledgeable about the subject matter of interest. Trustworthiness, on
the other hand, refers to "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate
the assertions he [sic] considers most valid” (p. 21). Although other source credibility
dimensions have been proposed via factor-analytic studies (e.g., Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969;
McCroskey, 1966), most persuasion scholars agree that credibility is a combination of expertise
and trustworthiness factors (Pornpitakpan, 2004; Stiff & Mongeau, 2016).
Hovland and Weiss (1951) demonstrated that high credibility sources are superior to low
credibility sources when it comes to producing attitude change. Since then, an abundance of
research has supported the assertion that high-credibility sources are more persuasive than lowcredibility sources (see Petty & Wegener, 1998; Pornpitakpan, 2004 for reviews). In addition to
being more persuasive, high credibility sources have also been shown to have a positive
influence on behavioral compliance (Crano, 1970; Levine, Moss, Ramsey, & Fleishman, 1978),
source evaluations (Albright & Levy, 1995), attitudes toward leadership (Mugny, Tafani,
Falomir, & Layat, 2000), confidence in thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages
(Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004; Petty, Briñol & Tormala, 2002), and even performance (Weick,
Gilfillan, & Keith, 1973).
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Within the elaboration likelihood (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and heuristic–
systematic (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989) models of persuasion, source credibility
can affect persuasion in one of three ways (Crano & Prislin, 2008; Kruglanski & Thompson,
1999; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty,
2006). First, when elaboration likelihood is low, source credibility could serve as a peripheral (or
heuristic) cue to persuasion. For example, an unmotivated recipient receiving a persuasive
message from a highly credible source should assume that the source’s assertions are valid, and
thereby spend little time elaborating the message. In this scenario, source credibility is viewed as
a direct path to persuasion, as it is expected to be the only influence on the expressed attitudes of
the message recipient. Second, when elaboration likelihood is high, source credibility can serve
as a persuasive argument and increase persuasion through issue-relevant cognitive responses
(Crano & Prislin, 2008; Fleming & Petty, 2000). Similarly, it can affect persuasion by positively
or negatively biasing systematic processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). The third way that
source credibility can influence persuasion is by affecting a recipient’s motivation or ability to
process information via systematic/central-route processing. For instance, if the elaboration
likelihood is in the middle range of the elaboration continuum, source credibility may increase a
recipient’s message-relevant thinking, leading them to invest more cognitive effort to process the
message (Crano & Prislin, 2008; Heesacker, Petty & Cacioppo, 1983; Kruglanski & Thompson,
1999).
Source-Message Incongruence and Trustworthiness
In addition to studying source credibility effects and underlying mechanisms, persuasion
researchers have also studied factors that can lead to increased or decreased credibility of a
communicator. For example, research suggests that incongruous, or unexpected source-message
5

pairings can influence the perceived credibility of the communicator, the persuasiveness of the
message, as well as the process by which persuasion occurs. Research in this area has revealed
that people generally expect a source to take a position that aligns with their own self-interest.
When a source violates the message recipient’s expectancies via the communication of an
incongruous message, the source is viewed as more trustworthy and their message more
believable than when a message is expected (Baker & Petty, 1994; Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken,
1978; Koeske & Crano, 1968; Petty, et al., 2001; Priester & Petty, 1995; Walster, Aronson, &
Abrahams, 1966).
Research conducted by Walster, Aronson, and Abrahams (1966) was among the earliest
to suggest that the credibility of a communicator may not depend simply on characteristics such
as expertise and trustworthiness, but an interaction between the source and the nature of the
message. That is, the extent to which a message aligns with a communicator’s best interest, or
whether the source has something to gain from the advocacy. They pointed to nonsignificant
findings from research by Hovland and Weiss (1951) in which a low credibility source led to
more opinion change than a high credibility source. In this study, a female gossip columnist
(considered a low credibility source) argued that there would be a decrease in the number of
movie theaters resulting from the advancement of television. Walster et al. speculated that the
gossip columnist was more effective than the reputable Fortune magazine because she was
arguing against her own best interest. To test the hypothesis that a low-credibility source could
be as, or even more effective, than a high-credibility source, they conducted an experiment in
which high credibility (a judge or prosecutor) and low (a criminal) credibility communicators
advocated either increased or reduced powers for the courts. They expected the criminal would
be more convincing when arguing for increased power for the courts, since this position
6

appeared contrary to his best interests. They expected the judge, on the other hand, to be more
convincing when advocating the argument for decreased power for the courts, which, in light of
his role, would not be expected (i.e., incongruous). Their results demonstrated that the advocacy
in favor of reduced court powers led to significantly more opinion change when coming from the
judge rather than the criminal, supporting their hypothesis. In addition to being more persuasive,
the incongruous source-message combination enhanced the perceived credibility of the judge,
compared to when he advocated the congruent message position.
Likewise, Dutton (1973) found both enhanced perceptions of source trustworthiness and
persuasiveness when the source was a so-called maverick (someone who had quit an
organization because of personal beliefs that were in conflict with the organization) compared to
a non-maverick. Koeske and Crano (1968) also sought to test the incongruity effect. They were
interested in whether the credibility of a statement (message) would be enhanced if the statement
was contrary, i.e., incongruous, to a source’s known or supposed ideological position. They
predicted that a statement made by an individual that is contrary to their known position would
be more credible (more believable) than if the statement were not attributed to any source. To do
this, they associated two known sources (William Westmoreland, Commander of U.S. forces in
the Vietnam War, and Stokeley Carmichael, an activist in the Black Power movement) with
simple “belief statements” and asked study participants to rate the credibility of each statement.
They found that statements attributed to an incongruous source were unequivocally more
believable than same (but unattributed) statement, although no source credibility effect emerged.
That is, there was no associated enhancement of source credibility for sources who made took an
incongruent position.
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In contrast to Koeske and Crano’s (1986) finding, other research has found enhanced
source credibility, but the effect did not extend to attitudes. McPeek and Edwards (1975) found
that perceptions of source credibility increased when two sources delivered unexpected
messages, either in favor or opposition to marijuana use, compared to an expected message.
However, the credibility effect did not enhance attitude change. In their study, a “hippie” student
and a seminary student training to become a Catholic priest advocated a message about
marijuana use that was contrary to participants’ initial opinion. The hippie advocating an antimarijuana (unexpected) position was more effective in changing attitudes (though the effect was
not significant) than the seminary student advocating the same (expected) position, but, contrary
to predictions, there was no impact on attitude change when the seminary student advocated an
unexpected (pro-marijuana) position. Similarly, Kohn and Snook (1976) revealed a significant
credibility effect but no significant change in attitude when a source advocated an incongruous
message. In their study, three different sources (liberal, conservative, and no political affiliation)
advocated against youthful illicit drug use. It was expected that the liberal source advocating the
anti-drug message would be the most unexpected, and therefore be the most persuasive,
perceived as most credible and evaluated most positively compared to the other sources. Results
indicated that the liberal source was most effective in arguing against illicit drug use compared to
the other sources, though the difference was only marginally significant. McGarry and Hendrick
(1974) also found credibility effects for incongruous source-message pairings, but no effect on
persuasion.
Attributional analysis of persuasion
The above research was largely the basis for the development of the Attributional
Analysis of Persuasion (AAP; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken,1978; Wood &
8

Eagly, 1981). Put simply, the analysis predicts that the more unexpected the message given the
communicator’s personal characteristics or situational pressures, the more persuasive it should
be. According to the AAP, this phenomenon is the result of a message recipient’s inferences
concerning why the communicator has taken the advocated position. Rooted in attribution theory
(Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1973), the AAP proposes that to the extent
the position taken in a message can be explained in terms of either personal characteristics of the
communicator or situational “pressures” driving their position, the message is regarded as biased
and thus should be relatively unpersuasive. On the other hand, attributing a source’s position to
accurate and unbiased reporting should make the message more persuasive.
In line with these ideas, Eagly and Chaiken (1975) exposed participants to a message
from an attractive or unattractive communicator who espoused either a desirable or undesirable
position on two topics: venereal disease and unemployment among recent college graduates.
Attractiveness was manipulated by having the source either praise (attractive) or derogate
(unattractive) the participant population (college undergraduates). Position desirability was
manipulated by using positions that were pre-tested by a set of undergraduate students as being
either desirable or undesirable. The desirable positions for venereal disease and unemployment,
respectively, were “Venereal disease will be controlled so successfully during the next five years
that the current epidemic will be completely curtailed," and "During the next three years,
unemployment among recent college graduates will drop sharply." The undesirable positions
were "Venereal disease will spread at such an astounding rate that it will soon become America's
No. 1 health problem," and "During the next three years, unemployment among recent college
graduates will surpass even the devastating level which occurred during the Great Depression of
the 1930s." The underlying expectancy assumption (which was tested and confirmed in a pilot
9

study) was that attractive communicators would be expected to take a desirable position and an
unattractive communicator would be expected to take an undesirable one; therefore,
unattractive/desirable combinations should be unexpected. Their results showed a significant
source attractiveness X position desirability interaction for opinion change for both topics, such
that the incongruous source-position combinations (i.e., unattractive/desirable combinations)
yielded greater opinion change than the congruous combinations (i.e., unattractive/undesirable
combinations). Although attractive communicators were overall more persuasive than
unattractive ones, an attractive communicator that confirmed expectancies (by advocating a
desirable position), was no more persuasive than an unattractive communicator that disconfirmed
expectancies (by advocating an undesirable position). Eagly and Chaiken proposed an
attributional explanation for their results, suggesting that the communicator characteristic of
attractiveness (the only background information given to message recipients) provided a causal
explanation for their position -- leading to the superiority of the attractive communicator’s
persuasive effect when communicating the undesirable message. Despite this interpretation, their
study did not provide an unambiguous demonstration of the attribution framework, given the fact
that attractive communicators and desirable positions were overall more persuasive than
unattractive communicators and desirable positions.
A subsequent study by Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken (1978) attempted to clarify the
attributional hypothesis and eliminate the complication of bias toward attractive sources and
desirable positions. In their experiment, respondents were given information about the waste
disposal practices of a fictitious company and the impact on a local city. Participants then read a
meeting transcript in which a mayoral candidate with either a pro-environmental or pro-business
background, speaking either to a group of businessmen or environmentalists, advocated a pro10

business or pro-environmental solution. It was expected that when the mayor disconfirmed
expectancies (based on either background information or the audience), that he would be seen as
less biased and produce more opinion change than when confirming expectancies. Indeed, when
the communicator's position disconfirmed subjects' expectancies based on the communicator's
background, the identity of his audience, or both factors, he was significantly more persuasive
than when expectancies were confirmed. In addition, his true opinion was regarded as more proenvironment when he addressed a pro-business rather than a pro-environment audience. In other
words, in the incongruous message conditions, the candidate was perceived to be more sincere.
Expectancy violation theory
Expectancy violation theory (EVT; J. Burgoon, 1993, J. Burgoon & Jones, 1976)
research provides further support for the idea that incongruent source-message combinations can
lead to more positive evaluations of an actor than than congruent communications (J. Burgoon &
LePoire, 1993). EVT is a communication theory that seeks to explain an individual’s response to
violations of expected behaviors. Initially developed to account for the effect of violations of
personal space expectations and violations, the theory has extended beyond nonverbal behaviors
and been applied to a variety of contexts such as interpersonal dialogue (J. Burgoon & LePoire,
1993), physician-patient communication (M. Burgoon, Birk, & Hall, 1991), online
communication behavior (Nichols & Rice, 2017), and health communication campaigns (Campo,
Cameron, Brossard, and Frazer, 2004; Siegel & J. Burgoon, 2002). EVT holds that
communication expectancies are enduring patterns of anticipated behavior. Expectancy
violations are “actions sufficiently discrepant from the expectancy to be noticeable and classified
as outside of the expectancy range” (J. Burgoon, 1995, p. 200). When this happens in an
interaction, arousal increases, and a series of cognitive appraisals are initiated within the
11

receiver. This “orienting response” shifts attention away from the message and toward the
interaction partner (J. Burgoon & LePoire, 1996) while the unexpected behavior and message are
scrutinized and evaluated by the receiver. EVT posits that both confirmations and violations can
be perceived as either positive or negative. Violation valences depend on (1) the evaluation of an
enacted behavior by the target, (2) whether the discrepancy between the expected and enacted
behavior is perceived by the target as more or less favorable, and (3) the magnitude of the
discrepancy. Positive violations occur when behaviors are evaluated by the target more favorably
than expected and negative violations occur when behaviors are evaluated by the target less
favorably than expected (J. Burgoon & Hale, 1988). In a practical sense, EVT predicts that a
communicator is better off committing a violation than doing what is expected, so long as the
violation is in the positive direction, that is, the target evaluates is more favorable than expected.
Negative violations, which are expected to have the worst outcomes, have been associated with
reduced liking and credibility (J. Burgoon & LePoire, 1993). Because the perceived valence of
an expectancy violation is related to the act of the breach itself rather than the violator, even a
disliked source can benefit from violations.
The research examining the effects of source-message incongruence supports the idea
that incongruent or unexpected source-message combinations may enhance source
trustworthiness, and, by extension, source credibility, and have more impact on attitude change
compared to congruent or expected messages. However, the inability for research studies to
consistently demonstrate a positive effect of incongruence on both attitudes and source
trustworthiness suggests more is at play. McGarry and Hendrick (1974) suggested the mixed
findings may have to do with factors such as the desirability of the position advocated, and the
level of involvement, and initial attitudes recipients have regarding message topics. Indeed,
12

many of the studies cited here failed to measure initial attitudes on a topic or take into account
personal relevance of the message recipients. The current research aims to clarify the effect of
source-message incongruence on source trustworthiness and attitudes by measuring and
controlling for initial attitudes and message relevance.
Message Processing and Incongruence
Research on the effects of source-message incongruence has also examined how it
influences message processing. Wood and Eagly’s (1981) attributional analysis posits that a
message recipient engages in a series of stages in message recipients’ information processing.
Information processing takes place both before and after the message. Prior to the message,
receivers use information about a communicator’s background to form expectancies about the
position the communicator will take in the message. After the message, recipients first make
inferences regarding the reason the communicator took the position they did. The first is the
personal or situational characteristics of the communicator. The second is relevant factual
evidence. Next, recipients determine the degree of communicator bias. Accordingly to Wood and
Eagly, if the receiver attributed the message as resulting from the communicator’s personal
characteristics or situation, the communicator is seen as biased. If, on the other hand, the
message was accounted for by factual evidence, the communicator is considered unbiased. The
perception of bias affects the persuasiveness of the message for the receiver in the next postmessage step. If the communicator is viewed as unbiased, persuasion increases. The perceived
bias of the communicator is also posited to affect the comprehension of the message. If the
message is perceived as unbiased, that is, the communicator accurately represented the facts,
there is less processing of the message compared to when the receiver perceives the
communicator to be biased.
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The extent to which the pre-message expectancy is confirmed or disconfirmed is
expected to impact on the outcome at each step of a recipient’s post-message processing. In their
research, disconfirmation of expectancies led to message recipients attributing the message to
factual evidence related to the issue at hand. On the other hand, when expectancies were
confirmed, message recipients attributed the message to the communicator’s background. The
extent to which recipients attributed the message to the factual evidence (via expectancy
disconfirmation) rather than to the communicator's background (via expectancy confirmation),
recipients perceived the message source as unbiased, and opinion change toward the advocated
message increased. They also found that message comprehension decreased when expectancies
were disconfirmed, whereas when expectancies were confirmed, message comprehension was
enhanced. Wood and Eagly suggest that when pre-message expectancies are confirmed, the
source and message are called into question and the recipient must analyze the message more
carefully prior to acceptance. Conversely, when expectancies are disconfirmed, the recipient
views the source as more trustworthy, and their message is perceived as more truthful; thus, there
is little need to scrutinize the message.
In contrast to AAP’s hypothesis that disconfirmation, or incongruence, decreases
message processing, considerable research has indicated the opposite: that more effortful
processing of messages occurs when expectancies are disconfirmed. For example, Baker and
Petty (1994) investigated the impacts of endorsement of a position by a numerical majority or
minority on message processing, and whether source-message congruence or incongruence led to
greater message scrutiny or cognitive elaboration. They found when the source-message pairings
were incongruent or unexpected (i.e., majority/counter attitudinal, minority/pro-attitudinal),
argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes than when the source and message position
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were expected (i.e., majority-pro and minority-counter messages)--a strong indicator of increased
elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Participants in Ziegler’s (2010) research engaged in more
effortful message processing when initial information disconfirmed rather than confirmed
expectancies. Ziegler, Diehl, and Ruther (2002) found that argument quality affected attitudes
and favorability of message-related thoughts in the case of inconsistent source characteristics but
not in the case of consistent source characteristics--that is, source incongruence led to increased
message scrutiny. Results from O’Brien and Myers (1985) and Hunt, Smith, and Kernan (1989)
also indicate that incongruence promotes deeper levels of message analysis and enhances
message recall. Furthermore, results from Eagly and Chaiken’s (1975) own AAP study also
contradict the hypothesis that disconfirmation decreases message processing. Using argument
recall as the measure for processing, their study showed that expectancy disconfirming messages
produced increased message processing (operationalized by message recall) than expectancy
confirming messages.
Priester and Petty (1995) sought to clarify the inconsistent findings regarding message
processing. Ultimately, their findings were in line with the AAP’s hypothesis that when a source
disconfirmed the expected message position, perceptions of source trustworthiness were
enhanced, and message processing was reduced compared to conditions in which the source took
the expected position. However, they clarified a moderator in the relationship: the processing
effect was most apparent for individuals who were not intrinsically motivated to think—those
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981).
Petty, Fleming, Priester, and Feinstein (2001) qualified the effect further by
distinguishing between individual versus group expectancies. They found that trustworthiness
was not enhanced in situations where a communicator violated the interest of an ingroup, rather
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than their own interest. When a group’s interest was violated, message scrutiny increased. They
suggest the increase in message scrutiny may be due to the greater attributional ambiguity when
group interest was violated. The level of personal involvement with a also appears to play a role
in message processing. People with higher levels of personal relevance tend to spend more time
processing messages, and process them in a more partisan way, than people with lower levels of
personal relevance (Howard-Pitney, Borgida, & Omoto, 1986). As a result, this research will
examine and take into account the role of personal relevance of the topic at hand.
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CHAPTER TWO:
The Importance of Trust in Environmental Risk Management
Risk scholars have increasingly recognized that public risk perceptions are linked to the
how much trust they have in risk managers and communicators (Flynn, Burns, Mertz, & Slovic,
1992; Leiss, 1996; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000; Viklund, 2003; Wynne, 1992). As a
result, there’s been a great deal of attention dedicated to the concept of source credibility in
environmental risk management and communication literature. Because risk management
typically involves the assessment and communication of risk by scientists who are considered
high on expertise (Fiske & Dupree, 2014), source credibility in this context is focused on the
trustworthiness component. Environmental risk management involves the evaluation of what
environmental risks exist and the determination for how to manage those risks in a manner that
protects public health and the environment (Environmental Protection Agency, 2019).
Risk communication is the process of informing people about the potential risks that exist
in the environment. This process typically has one of two objectives. First, it can be used to
create a sense of urgency (i.e., increase perceptions of risk) when people are not concerned about
a hazard (risk object) but evidence indicates the hazard does pose a significant threat. An
example of this risk-enhancing type of communication is a message urging the evacuation of a
community during a catastrophic flood event. Risk communication can also be used to calm
people down (i.e., decrease perceptions of risk) when people are highly concerned about a risk
object, but data indicate it does not pose a significant threat (Covello & Sandman, 2001). An
example of a risk-reducing type of communication is a public health campaign aimed at
dispelling misconceptions about childhood vaccinations in order to increase vaccination
behaviors.
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Risk communication stemmed from risk perception research and the recognition that
technical experts and the public view and understand risk very differently. Technical risk
assessment experts determine acceptable risk by calculating the product of the probability and
consequences of a “hazard,” or adverse event. This approach assumes that risk estimates are
determined by rational and objective evaluations, and do not consider political, economic,
emotional, or social conditions. The public, on the other hand, rely on a broader, more subjective
set of criteria to evaluate riskiness.
The Basis of Risk Perceptions
In its most basic sense, risk can be defined as “things, forces, or circumstances that pose
danger to people or to what they value” (National Research Council, 1996, p. 215). Three
questions are generally considered in the understanding of risk: (1) What can go wrong?, (2)
How likely is that to happen?, and (3) If it does go wrong, what are the consequences? (Kaplan
& Garrick, 1981). From a technical perspective, risk is viewed objectively, and encompasses two
dimensions: probability of the occurrence of a hazard event and the magnitude of consequences
of the event (Breakwell, 2007; Rayner & Cantor, 1987). One of the primary approaches to
understanding risk perception is the psychometric paradigm, which is based on the premise that
people’s risk judgments are influenced by the unique qualities, or characteristics, of different
types of risks (Slovic, 1987). The psychometric paradigm originated with work of Starr (1969),
which attempted to weigh technological risks and benefits to answer the question, “How safe is
safe enough?” Concerns about the validity of the assumptions in Starr’s revealed preferences
approach prompted Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs (1978) to conduct a
similar study about expressed preferences. In this seminal study, Fischhoff et al. (1978) revealed
that whereas experts focus on the quantitative characteristics of a risk object, most people make
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risk judgments based on unique qualities, or characteristics, of different types of risks. According
to this research, known as the psychometric paradigm, perceptions of risk increase to the extent
that exposure is involuntary, the effects are immediate, the risk is not well understood, it is
controlled by others, it is unfamiliar, and is not naturally occurring (Slovic, 2016). Subsequent
research has classified this range of risk characteristics as falling into two key categories that
determine the perception and acceptance of risk: dread and unknown risk (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et
al., 1985; Slovic et al., 1986). These two key risk characteristics have emerged across multiple
cultures (Cha, 2000; Englander, Farago, Slovic, & Fischhoff,1986; Renn & Rohrmann, 2000;
Tiegen, Brun, & Slovic, 1988) and hazards (Gaskell et al., 2004; Gstraunthaler & Day, 2008).
Other research has examined individual characteristics that influence risk perceptions.
Overall, risks tend to be judged lower by men (especially white men) than women (Bord &
Connor, 1997; Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield,
2000; Lindell & Hwang, 2008; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994; Gutteling & Wiegman, 1993;
Steger & Witt, 1989) and older people tend to view hazards as more harmful than younger
people, as do individuals with lower incomes compared to those with higher incomes (Lindell &
Hwang, 2008; Mohai & Bryant, 1998; Shepherd, Jepson, Watterson, & Evans, 2011).
The role of affect in the construction of risk perception has gained increasing awareness
over the past two decades. Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson’s (2000) affective heuristic
and Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch’s (2001) risk-as-feelings hypothesis expanded
individual risk perceptions to include not only what people think about a risk, but also how they
feel about it, and how much they like or dislike an external stimulus.
Other scholars have examined social processes that influence risk perceptions. Most
notably, the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) defines a phenomenon by which
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psychological, social, institutional and cultural processes interact to amplify or attenuate public
risk perceptions that subsequently shape risk behavior, influence institutional processes, and
affect risk consequences (Kasperson et al., 1988; Kasperson, Golding, & Tuler, 1992; Kasperson
& Kasperson, 1996). SARF posits that risk perceptions are influenced by various signals that are
processed at formal or informal amplification stations. These amplification stations can include
the scientists or experts who conduct and communicate technical risk assessments, the riskmanagement institution, news media, social activist organizations, opinion leaders within social
groups, personal networks, and public agencies. Amplification occurs at two stages: in the
transfer of information about the risk, and in the response mechanisms of society. Amplified risk
leads to societal behavioral responses that result in secondary impacts, or ripple effects. Ripple
effects might include enduring mental perceptions and attitudes, such as anti-technology attitudes
or social apathy, impacts on business sales and economic activity, political and social pressure,
social disorder such as protesting or rioting, and increased liability and insurance costs. An
underlying assumption of SARF is that the nature and magnitude of risk are determined by these
systems and public responses that create amplification.
The Relationship Between Trust and Risk
Trust in risk management has been found to lead to lower risk perceptions and higher
perceived benefits from a hazard or technology (Flynn et al., 1992; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth,
2000; Viklund, 2003). It has also been found to increase individual acceptance of risk (Earle,
2004; Kasperson et al., 1992; Leiss, 1996; Löfstedt, 2005; Renn & Levine, 1991) and may
influence public compliance with risk management recommendations (Trettin & Musham, 2000).
Distrust in risk management, on the other hand, can increase public concern and lead people to
oppose even the smallest risks and the institutions responsible for managing them (Freudenburg,
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1993; Kasperson, et al., 1992; McComas & Trumbo, 2001; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). Distrust
has also been linked to political activism (Slovic, 1993; 1999) and it can lead to the
stigmatization of technologies that experts deem relatively safe (e.g., Flynn et al., 1992) as well
as the social amplification of risk after a risk management failure (Freudenberg, 2003;
Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic, 2003).
The Roots of Public Distrust in Risk Management
The earliest attempts at environmental risk communication focused on experts correcting
the ‘misperceptions’ of an ignorant public (Bennet, 1999). The tendency was to view public
involvement as a liability, leading to poor and more costly risk management decisions.
Communication was typically viewed as a top-down process in which organizations inform and
educate the public about risk information to persuade the public towards “rationality” and accept
risk judgments. This approach contradicts the current view of risk communication. It has evolved
over the past few decades from being viewed as simply a means to bridge the gulf between
expert views and public perceptions of risk, to a more collaborative, democratic endeavor where
attempts are made to understand people’s perceptions of risk, openly provide information, and
collaborate with the public to develop solutions. Communication is regarded as constructive
dialogue among all stakeholders and a central part of the decision making with risk management
(Gurabardhi et al., 2005; Rowe, 1994). On the whole, trust in risk management sustained
significant damage during the evolutionary process (see Fischhoff, 1995 for a review).
Once trust has been broken, it is very difficult to re-establish. Slovic (1993) demonstrated
the fragile nature of trust through what he called the trust asymmetry principle. The trust
asymmetry principle holds that negative information reduces trust more than positive
information increases trust and explains why trust can take years to build yet can be destroyed in
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an instant by a single misstep. Slovic attributes the bias toward distrust to a few key factors.
First, negative (trust-destroying) events are usually well-defined incidents and therefore more
noticeable than positive (trust-building) ones. Second, negative events carry much greater weight
than do positive events (e.g., Hovland and Weiss, 1951). In addition, sources of information
about negative events tend to be seen as more credible than sources of positive news. Finally,
once distrust has been introduced, it tends to be reinforced and perpetuated, either through
avoidance of distrusted sources or by viewing future events through the lens of prior distrust. The
trust asymmetry principle has been demonstrated across various risk contexts, ranging from
nuclear power (Cvetkovich et al., 2002) through genetically modified foods (Poortinga &
Pidgeon, 2004) to food additives (White, Pahl, Buehner, & Haye, 2003) and occupational risks
(Conchie & Burns, 2008), and it may explain in part why public distrust still plagues
environmental risk controversies.
Compounding the problem for individual risk managers is the overall decline in trust of
social institutions, especially government and industry, over the past several decades. Research
suggests that the less confidence people have in an institution, the more trust they assign to
organizations that act as checks and balances (Lipset & Schneider, 1983). This explains why the
number of citizen-based organizations have increased, and publics have increasingly shifted their
trust to these groups (Heath & O’Hair, 2010; Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997). Laird (1989)
describes the situation in which the public is increasingly reluctant to defer important decisions
to institutional elites in the government as part of an overall “decline in deference” (p. 543).
Slovic, Flynn, and Layman (1991) similarly describe a “crisis of confidence” (p. 1606) for
technological risk managers. In line with these descriptions, a number of studies have shown that

22

most federal and state agencies, who are often tasked with environmental risk management, are
perceived as untrustworthy (see Chryssochoidis, Strada, & Krystallis, 2009 for a review).
The risk management literature affirms the importance of trust for effective risk
management and communication. It also brings to light the significant challenges risk managers
and communicators face with earning and maintaining public trust, making the field
of environmental risk management a ripe context to test the efficacy of incongruous sourcemessage statements to enhance source trustworthiness.
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CHAPTER THREE:
Study 1
The overall goal of this research was to examine the efficacy of incongruent versus
congruent source-message combinations to change attitudes and enhance communicator trust.
while taking into account environmental concern and political ideology. To investigate these
ideas, two experiments were conducted. A scenario based on the proposal of a (hypothetical)
hazardous waste site as a Superfund site was the context for the research. The scenario describes
a hypothetical site--the Wagner Laboratory--that is being considered for designation as a
Superfund site. Superfund is a federal program established by the United States Congress in
1980 designed to facilitate cleanup of sites that have been contaminated with chemical and other
hazardous substances resulting from the poor management of hazardous waste, and authorizes
the EPA to seek out the parties responsible for the contamination and assure their cooperation.
Study 1 explores how source-message incongruence and environmental concern
influence perceptions and evaluations of the source and their message, as well as perceived risk
and support for risk management. Study 2 examines how source-message incongruence or
congruence and environmental concern influences cognitive elaboration of messages in the same
environmental risk management context.
Study 1
Focusing on the domain of environmental risk management and, specifically, on
messages advocating either for or against the designation of a hazardous waste site as Superfund,
the primary goal of Study 1 was to determine the effect of source-message incongruence and on
source trustworthiness, message believability, attitudes, perceived risk, and trust in risk
management.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Taking into account the covariates (environmental concern and political
beliefs), participants in conditions in which sources advocate incongruous messages (i.e.,
corporate source advocating pro-environmental message and environmental activist advocating a
pro-business message) will report significant changes in attitudes regarding the Superfund
designation, toward the advocated position, compared to congruous message conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Taking into account the covariates, participants in conditions in which
sources advocate incongruous messages will report significantly more positive source
trustworthiness between pre-message and post-message evaluations compared to congruous
message conditions.
Hypothesis 3: Taking into account the covariates, participants in conditions in which
sources advocate incongruous messages will report significantly lower perceptions of risk
regarding the cleanup site, compared to those in which congruous messages are advocated.
Hypothesis 4: Taking into account the covariates, participants in conditions in which
sources advocate incongruous messages will report significantly stronger support for risk
management compared to when congruous messages are advocated.
Method
Participants
Participants included 270 adults (aged 18 and over) recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (Mturk; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Paolacci,
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) to participate in a study hosted by Qualtrics, an online survey
platform. They were offered $1.00 for their participation and told it will take approximately 1015 minutes of their time. The sample was restricted to U.S. citizens because two of the three
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independent variables were delivered in a scenario-based manipulation related to U.S.
environmental policy. From the initial sample of 270 respondents, 115 cases (42.5%) were
removed from the analyses: 38 respondents were removed because they did not complete the
survey (14.1%), 48 respondents (17.7%) were removed because they were either located outside
of the U.S. or their IP address included multiple entries, seven people (2.6%) responded to the
data quality measure that their data should not be used in the analysis, and 22 people (8.1%)
were excluded for failing the manipulation checks. The final data set was comprised of 155
respondents.
The final sample (N = 155) was heavily male (58.7%), and predominantly Caucasian
(72.9% Caucasian, 7.7% Hispanic/Latino, 9.7% Black/African American, 7.1% Asian/Pacific
Islander, 4.1% Native American/Alaskan Native, and 0.6% Mixed Race). The average age was
36 years (M = 36.60, SD = 10.83) and most participants had at least some college experience
(12.9% high school diploma, 19.4% some college no degree, 14.2% Associate degree, 39.4%
Bachelor’s degree, 9.0% Master’s degree, 0.6% Doctoral degree, and 4.5% professional degree).
In terms of political ideology, the sample leaned left (M = 2.72, SD = 2.13 on a 1-7 scale with
left/right anchors). A total of 52.9% identified as Democrat, 22.6% as Republican, 23.9% as
Independent, and 0.6% as Other.
Design and Procedure
The study employed a 2 (source type: corporate risk manager vs. environmental activist)
X 2 (message type: pro-environmental versus pro-business) x 2 (time: pre-message versus postmessage measures) mixed factorial design. A pre/post- measure was utilized to Participants were
randomly assigned via block randomization to one of the four source-message conditions via a
scenario-based manipulation.
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Participants were told they would participate in a survey regarding environmental
contamination and cleanup. They learned about the Wagner Laboratory, a former research
facility near a town called Springfield where missile defense systems and rocket engines were
tested and manufactured. Participants were told the facility is owned and operated by Wagner
Aerospace Corporation and is being considered for designation by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency as a Superfund site due to the contamination of groundwater at the site.
Respondents were then asked to read a newspaper article containing the experimental
manipulations. The newspaper article reported on an EPA-sponsored public meeting about the
Wagner Laboratory and the Superfund designation. Page 1 of the article described general
background information about the site--its operational history, potential impacts from the
contamination left behind, and ongoing cleanup efforts. Participants were also introduced to the
“Friends of the Environment,” an environmental organization that was described as being active
in ensuring the cleanup of the Wagner Laboratory, and critical of the speed at which cleanup was
occurring.
After reading page 1, and before reading page 2 of the article, participants were provided
some additional background information about the Superfund designation. Participants were told
that having a site designated as a Superfund is controversial, and that some people are strongly in
favor of the designation, and others strongly oppose it. In order to set expectancies regarding
source-message congruence for both sources and positions, all participants read both viewpoints
about Superfund designations in general. Participants read both an argument in support of
Superfund designation and an argument against it. The argument in favor of Superfund stated
that the EPA should have the authority to mandate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites to ensure
that parties responsible for the contamination bear the burden of the cleanup costs. The argument
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against Superfund designation stated that a Superfund designation adds excessive regulatory
oversight that can lead to increased cleanup costs and extend the time to complete cleanup. The
pro-Superfund designation viewpoint was described as a generally pro-environmental position
and the anti-Superfund designation viewpoint was described as generally pro-business position.
After reading the arguments for and against Superfund designation, respondents were asked to
finish reading the newspaper article. Page 2 conveyed the experimental manipulations in the
form of a direct quote from a gentleman by the name of Steve Fields who spoke at the EPA
public meeting. Mr. Field’s affiliation and message position varied depending on experimental
condition. In environmental source conditions, Mr. Fields was described as the president of
Friends of the Environment, a nonprofit organization committed to the protection of the
environment and public health. In the corporate source conditions he was described as the
cleanup project manager for Wagner Aerospace Corporation (owner of the cleanup site). In the
pro-environmental conditions, Mr. Fields stated support for the Superfund designation, and in the
pro-business conditions, he opposed the Superfund designation.
After reading Mr. Field’s position on Superfund designation, participants completed
survey questions intended to measure attitudes toward Superfund, perceived trustworthiness of
the Wagner Aerospace Corporation and Friends of the Environment, perceived risk associated
with the Wagner Laboratory site, and support for risk management (Wagner Aerospace
Corporation).
Manipulated Variables
Source type. Steve Fields, was described as either the cleanup project manager for the
Wagner Aerospace Corporation, owner of the potential Superfund site, or the president of
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Friends of the Environment, a nonprofit organization committed to the protection of the
environment and public health.
Message position. Steve Fields was quoted as either strongly supporting (proenvironmental) or strongly opposing (pro-business) the Superfund designation of the Wagner
Laboratory.
In total, there were two congruent (environmentalist source/pro-environmental message,
corporate source/pro-business message) and two incongruent (environmentalist source/probusiness message, corporate source/pro-environmental message) conditions. See Appendix A for
the newspaper article for each of the four experimental conditions.
Measures
Environmental concern. Prior research suggests that greater environmental concern is
associated with greater risk perceptions across a variety of ecological risks (Kellstedt, Zahran, &
Vedlitz, 2008; Stern and Dietz, 1994; Slimak and Dietz, 2006). As such, prior to reading the
experimental messages, respondents were asked to answer a series of questions about their
thoughts and feelings toward the Earth and the environment. Participants completed the revised
New Environmental Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). The NEP
is a 15-item, 7-point Likert Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (α = .73). In
the environmental psychology literature, NEP is commonly understood to measure general
environmental concern (Bogner & Wiseman, 2002; Poortinga, Steg, & Vlek, 2004; Schuett &
Ostergren, 2003). Sample items include “Humans have the right to modify the natural
environment to suit their needs,” “Humans are seriously abusing the environment,” and “The socalled “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.”
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Attitudes. To measure attitudes, participants then gave their opinion about the Superfund
designation by responding to a 7-point scale ranging from 1-“oppose Superfund designation” to
7-“support Superfund designation.” In addition, they responded to a six-item, 7-point semantic
differential scale with the following anchors: bad/good, unfavorable/favorable,
harmful/beneficial, worthless/valuable foolish/wise, and unfair/fair. The seven items were
combined into a single measure (α = .98). Attitudes were measured both before and after
participants were exposed to the experimental manipulations.
Source trustworthiness. Respondents completed a six-item, 7-point semantic differential
scale evaluating the trustworthiness of both the Friends of the Environment (α = .93), and
Wagner Aerospace Corporation (α = .97) sources. Scale anchors were: negative/positive, does
not care about me/cares about me, not credible/credible, biased/unbiased, bad/good, and
untrustworthy/trustworthy. Source trustworthiness for both the corporate and environmental
sources were measured at two time points: once before the experimental manipulation and once
after. The trustworthiness of the source communicating the experimental message was of most
interest to this investigation, but respondents evaluated the trustworthiness of both the corporate
and environmental organizations, regardless of their message condition. Thus, it is possible to
examine the evaluations of trustworthiness for the organization at odds with the source of the
experimental message (page 1 of the newspaper article stated that the Friends of the Environment
organization had been “critical of the speed at which the cleanup was occurring,” setting up the
group as critics of the Wagner Corporation). For the purposes of this study, these groups will be
referred to as the source’s outgroup.
Perceived risk. A seven-item Likert Scale (1-7; Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) was
used to assess perceived risk associated with the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site
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(α = .70). Sample questions included “The threat from contamination of the Wagner Laboratory
site will extend to future generations,” “Living near the Wagner Laboratory site is risky,” and
“The Wagner Laboratory site poses negative impacts to human health.” Perceived risk was
measured before and after the experimental manipulations.
Support for risk management. Participants rated their trust in “Wagner Aerospace
Corporation management” to effectively manage the contamination from Wagner Laboratory
site. Responses were given on a scale ranging from 1-“strongly disagree” to 7-“strongly agree”
(α = .97). The six scale items were: “I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to: (1)
effectively manage the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site, (2) provide the best
available information on the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site, (3) provide me
with enough information to decide what actions I should take regarding the contamination from
the Wagner Laboratory site, (4) provide me with truthful information about the contamination
from the Wagner Laboratory site, (5) provide me with timely information the contamination
from the Wagner Laboratory site, (6) to make wise decisions regarding the cleanup of the
Wagner Laboratory site. Support for risk management measured both before and after
participants were exposed to the experimental manipulations.
Manipulation check and data quality measures. After reading the newspaper article
containing the experimental manipulations, participants were asked to report (depending on
condition) either Wagner Aerospace Corporation or Friends of the Environment’s position
regarding the Superfund designation on a Likert-type scale (1-7; Oppose Superfund designation
to Support Superfund designation). Participants whose ratings were not 5 or above, or 3 and
below, depending on condition, were removed from the analysis. Participants also reported
whether their attention to the study was adequate to produce accurate responses. It was
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acknowledged that some people get distracted during surveys and are not able to respond
thoughtfully, and participants responded to the following yes/no question: Without penalty (you
will still receive compensation for your time), please tell us -- should we use the data from your
responses?”
Political Ideology. Participants indicated their current political ideology on a 2-item
Likert Scale (1-7; left/right and liberal/conservative); α = .94). Lower scores indicate more
liberal political leanings and higher scores indicate more conservative political leanings.
Demographics. Participant background information was collected, including age, sex,
education level, and ethnicity. See Appendix B for all Study 1 Measures. See also Table 1 for
scale correlations and descriptive statistics. among all scales.
Table 1
Study 1 Pre-Test Variables: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (N=155)
Measure
1
2
3
4
**
1 Attitudes
1
-.036
.295
.204*

5
-.106

.083

-.281**

.869**

1

.176*

.085

.291**

.053

1

-.242**

.473**

-.151

1

.166*

.284**

2 Corporate source
trustworthiness

1

3 Environmental source
trustworthiness
4 Perceived risk
5 Support for risk
management
6 Environmental concern

6
.117
.111

7
-.307**
.281**

.015

7 Political ideology

1
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Measure
M

1
5.66

2
3.38

3
5.29

4
4.99

5
3.24

6
4.66

7
2.74

SD

1.46

1.51

1.04

0.75

1.59

0.78

2.06

α

.98

.97

.93

.70

.97

.73

.94

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Results
Correlational Analyses
In line with prior research, attitudes were significantly, positively correlated with
perceived risk (r = .204, p < .05). Attitudes and environmental concern were also positively
correlated (r = .172, p < .05), indicating that the more environmental concern a participant
reported, the more positive their attitudes toward the Superfund designation. Additionally,
attitudes significantly, positively correlated with trust in the environmental source, such that the
greater the trust, the more positive attitudes toward the Superfund designation (r = .295, p < .01),
There was also a significant, negative correlation between attitudes and political ideology, such
that the further right, or more conservatism participants reported, the less they supported the
Superfund designation (r = - .347, p < .01). In other words, the more conservative one’s political
ideology, the less they aligned with the pro-environmental position regarding Superfund (and,
thus the more they aligned with the pro-business position). Similarly, there was a significant
positive correlation between political ideology and both corporate source trustworthiness (r =
.281, p < .01) and support for risk management (r = .284, p < .01). Participants reporting more
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conservative political leanings reported more trust in the corporate source, and more support for
risk management. Perceived risk was significantly positively correlated with environmental
concern (r = .473, p < .01) and negatively correlated with corporate source trustworthiness (r = .281, p < .01) and support for risk management (r = - .242, p < .01).
Pre-Message Evaluations
Univariate analysis of variance yielded no significant initial differences between
conditions of participants’ responses to key pre-message measures of attitudes regarding the
Superfund designation F(3, 154) = 1.07, p = .363, perceptions of trustworthiness of the
environmentalist source F(3, 154) = .045, p = .987 or the corporate source F(3, 154) = 1.71, p =
.168. However, overall, pre-message attitudes were biased toward the environmental position
such that respondents were overall in favor of the environmental position of designating the
Wagner Laboratory as a Superfund site (M = 5.65, SD = 1.46 on a 7-point scale). There was also
a pro-environmental bias regarding pre-message evaluations of source trustworthiness. A paired
sample t-test revealed that, overall, the environmentalist source was perceived as significantly
more trustworthy (M = 5.29, SD = 1.04) than the corporate source (M = 3.38, SD = 1.51), t(154)
= 12.88, p < .001, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Pre-message evaluations of source trustworthiness. Note: higher scores indicate more
trust.
Source and Message Effects
A three-way mixed MANCOVA was conducted to assess whether there was a
statistically significant difference between conditions across time points for attitude, source
trustworthiness, perceived risk, and support for risk management while taking into account the
covariates of environmental concern and political ideology. The independent between-group
variables were source (environmentalist versus corporate) and message type (pro-environmental
versus pro-business). The repeated measure (Time 1, Time 2) indicated pre-message and postmessage measures of the dependent variables (attitude, source trustworthiness, perceived risk,
and support for risk management).
Between Subjects Effects
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The MANCOVA for the between effect showed there was a statistically significant
overall main effect of message type, F(5, 145) = 2.97, p = .013; Pillai’s Trace = .094, partial η =
2

.094, while taking into account the covariates; however, the overall main effect of source type
did not reach statistical significance (F(5, 145) = 2.00, p = .08; Pillai’s Trace = .065, partial η =
2

.065). The main effect of message type was significant for corporate source trustworthiness, F(1,
149) = 10.18, p < .01, partial η = .064, and support for risk management, F(1, 149) = 11.72, p =
2

.001, partial η = .073. To follow up on the significant main effect of message type, post hoc
2

analyses were conducted to assess the differences between groups, while taking the covariates
into account. Pairwise comparisons indicated that, regardless of the source type, when the proenvironmental message was advocated, respondents reported significantly more trust in the
corporate source (M = 3.73) than when the pro-business message was endorsed (M = 3.01), M =
diff

.204, p < .01, 95% CI [.271, 1.15]. In addition, the pro-environmental message resulted in
significantly more support for risk management (M = 3.66) compared to the pro-business
message (M = 2.86), M = .803, p = .001, 95% CI [.340, 1.27]. The MANCOVA also revealed a
diff

statistically significant two-way interaction between source type and message type, F(5, 145) =
5.52, p = .02; Pillai’s Trace = .088, partial η = .088. The two-way source type by message type
2

interaction was significant for corporate source trustworthiness, F(1, 149) = 2.79, p < .05, partial
η = .036, and environmental source trustworthiness, F(1, 149) = 4.38, p < .05, partial η = .029.
2

2

Post hoc tests revealed that in conditions in which the corporate source advocated the proenvironmental (incongruent) message, they were viewed as significantly more trustworthy (M =
4.09, SD = 1.41) overall than when advocating the pro-business (congruent) message position (M
= 2.70, SD = .870), M = .1.29, p < .001, 95% CI [.707, 1.87], providing support for Hypotheses
diff

2. On the other hand, when the environmental source advocated the pro-environmental
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(congruent) message, they were perceived as significantly more trustworthy overall (M = 5.32,
SD = 1.28) than when advocating the pro-business (incongruent) message (M = 4.81, SD = .876),
M = .513, p < .05, 95% CI [.059, .968], although there was no difference in corporate source
diff

trustworthiness. This result was the opposite of what was predicted in Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis
1, 3, and 4 were not supported.
Within Subjects Effects
The MANCOVA test for the within (repeated measures) effect did not show an overall
main effect of time, F(5, 145) = .539, p = .746; Pillai’s Trace = .018, partial η = .018. However,
2

it revealed a two-way interaction between source type and time, F(5, 145) = 6.15, < .001; Pillai’s
Trace = .175, partial η = .175 and a two-way interaction between message type and time, F(5,
2

145) = 5.81, p < .001; Pillai’s Trace = .167, partial η = .167. The multivariate test for the within
2

effect also showed a statistically significant three-way interaction between source type, message
type, and time, indicating an overall difference between the four message conditions across time
points while taking into account environmental concern and political ideology, F(5, 145) =
10.59, p <.001; Pillai’s Trace = .267, partial η = .267. Univariate tests indicated this three-way
2

interaction was significant for attitudes (F(1, 149) = 3.92, p = .049, partial η = .026),
2

environmental source trustworthiness, F(1, 149) = 12.21, p = .001, partial η = .076), corporate
2

source trustworthiness (F(1, 149) = 18.80, p < .001, partial η = .175), and support for risk
2

management, F(1, 149) = 12.91, p < .001, partial η = .080. The differences in perceived risk
2

across conditions did not reach statistical significance (F(1, 149) = 12.91, p < .080.
To follow up on the significant interaction, simple effect analyses were conducted to
assess which groups had statistically significant differences between pre-test and post-test while
taking the covariates into account.
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Attitudes
Simple effects analyses of the two-way interaction between source type and time showed
that environmental source conditions, regardless of message advocated, produced less favorable
attitudes toward the Superfund designation (the pro-business position) between pre-message (M
= 5.46, SD = 1.60) and post-message measures (M = 5.28, SD = 1.80), though the change did not
reach statistical significance M = .189, p = .09, 95% CI [-.30, .408]. In contrast, the corporate
diff

source conditions, regardless of their message, produced more favorable attitudes toward the
Superfund designation (the pro-environmental position) between pre-message (M = 5.87, SD =
1.27) and post-message measures (M = 5.98, SD = 1.34), though the change was not statistically
significant, M = -.113, p = .11, 95% CI [-.249, .024]. A univariate comparison of attitude
diff

change scores revealed that the environmental source produced significantly more attitude
change between time points than the corporate source (M = -.189 versus M = .113, respectively),
M = -.294, p = .03, 95% CI [-.563, -.025].
diff

Simple effects analyses of the two-way interaction between message and time showed
that, regardless of the source, when the pro-business message was advocated, there was a
significant change in attitudes between the pre-message (M = 5.69, SD = 1.48) and post-message
measures (M = 5.41, SD = 1.71), M = .275, p < .01, 95% CI [.079, .470] toward the prodiff

business position. In other words, the pro-business message led to more negative attitudes toward
the Superfund designation. On the other hand, when the environmental message was advocated,
there was no statistically significant change in attitudes between pre-message (M = 5.63, SD =
1.46) and post-message measures (M = 5.78, SD = 1.56), M = -.149, p = .11. A univariate
diff

comparison of attitude change scores revealed that the pro-business message produced
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significantly more attitude change between time points than the pro-environmental source (M = .275 versus M = .149, respectively), M = -.462, p = .001, 95% CI [-.734, -.191].
diff

Simple effects analyses of the three-way interaction, which subsumes all main effects and
interactions, and hence is the most relevant of the comparisons, revealed significant differences
in the persuasiveness of the incongruent compared to the congruent source-message
combinations. In line with Hypothesis 1, the environmental source advocating the pro-business
(incongruent) message led to a significant change in attitude toward the corporate position
between pre-message (M = 5.50, SD = 1.54) and post-message measures (M = 4.99, SD = 1.76),
M = .517, p = .001, 95% CI [.222, .812], whereas when the corporate source advocated the prodiff

business (congruent) message, there was no attitude change between pre-message and postmessage measures (M = 5.91, SD = 1.40 versus M = 5.93, SD = 1.52, p = .808). For the corporate
source advocating the pro-environmental (incongruent) message, there was a significant change
in attitude pre-message and post-message attitude measures toward the environmental position,
as expected (M = 5.85, SD = 1.16 versus M = 6.03, SD = 1.21, respectively), but the change was
not quite statistically significant (p = .084). In line with expectations, the environmental source
advocating the pro-environmental (congruent) message, led to no attitude change between premessage and post-message measures (M = 5.41, SD = 1.67 versus M = 5.53, SD = 1.82,
respectively), most likely because of a ceiling effect. See Figure 2.

39

Attitudes Toward Superfund Designation
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Figure 2. Attitudes as a function of source, message, and time. Note: higher scores indicate more
positive attitudes toward Superfund (the pro-environmental position) and lower scores indicate
more negative attitudes toward Superfund (the pro-business position).
Additionally, a comparison of attitude change scores between Time 1 and Time 2
revealed a significant difference in change scores across conditions, F(3, 155) = 6.69, p < .001.
The most persuasive source-message combination was the environmentalist source advocating
the pro-business message (M = - .546, SE = .131), followed by the other incongruent
combination in which the corporate source advocated the pro-environmental message (M = .184,
SE = .127), see Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Attitude changes scores across experimental conditions
Source Trustworthiness
Simple effects analyses of the two-way interaction between message type and time
showed that, regardless of the source, when the pro-environmental message was advocated,
perceptions of corporate source trustworthiness significantly increased between pre-message (M
= 3.63, SD = 1.69) and post-message measures (M = 3.98, SD = 1.73), M = -.353, p = .01, 95%
diff

CI [-.631, -.075], taking into account the covariates. Evaluations of environmental source
trustworthiness also increased between pre-message (M = 5.28, SD = 1.13) and post-message (M
= 5.41, SD = 1.19) measures, though the change did not reach statistical significance M = -.139,
diff

p = .08, 95% CI [-.299, .021]. When the pro-business message was advocated, regardless of the
source advocating the message, corporate source trustworthiness decreased significantly between
pre-message (M = 3.10, SD = 1.23) and post-message (M = 2.78, SD = 1.34) evaluations, M =
diff

.317, p < 05, 95% CI [.041, .593]. Environmental source trustworthiness also decreased
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significantly between pre-message (M = 5.30, SD = 0.94) and post-message (M = 4.85, SD =
1.40) evaluations, M = .453, p = 01, 95% CI [.102, .804].
diff

Simple effects analyses of the two-way interaction between source and time revealed
significant differences between evaluations of source trustworthiness, regardless of message
type, between timepoints, while taking into account environmental concern and political
ideology. In the environmental source conditions, evaluations of trustworthiness of the
(environmental) source significantly decreased between pre-message (M = 5.30, SD = 1.19) and
post-message measures (M = 4.85, SD = 1.50), M = .447, p < .01, 95% CI [.140, .753].
diff

Evaluations of trustworthiness of the source’s outgroup (corporation) also decreased significantly
between pre-message (M = 3.44, SD = 1.58) and post-message evaluations (M = 3.22, SD =
1.62), M = .220, p < .05, 95% CI [.018, .422].
diff

On the other hand, in corporate source conditions, regardless of the message,
trustworthiness of the (corporate) source increased between pre-message (M = 3.32, SD = 1.44)
and post-message measures (M = 3.66, SD = 1.70), though it did not quite reach statistical
significance, M = -.338, p = .06, 95% CI [-.691, .015]. Evaluations of trustworthiness of the
diff

source’s outgroup (environmental organization) also increased between pre-message (M = 5.27,
SD = 0.87) and post-message measures (M = 5.48, SD = 0.99), M = -.212, p < .01, 95% CI [diff

.355, -.068].
The three-way interaction between source, message, and time subsumes and clarifies
these two-way interactions. The environmentalist source advocating the pro-business
(incongruent) message was evaluated as significantly less trustworthy between pre-message (M =
5.34, SD = 1.01) and post-message measures (M = 4.29, SD = 1.44), M = 1.04, p < .001, 95%
diff

CI [.515, 1.57]. This was in the opposite direction predicted in Hypothesis 1. The corporate
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source advocating the environmental (incongruent) message was evaluated, in accordance with
expectations, significantly more trustworthy between pre-message (M = 3.56, SD = 1.60) and
post-message measures (M = 4.62, SD = 1.46), M = - 1.06, p < .001, 95% CI [- 1.42, -.695]. As
diff

expected based on Hypothesis 2, there was no significant change in perceptions of environmental
source trustworthiness in the congruent message condition in which the environmentalist source
advocated the pro-environmental message (M = 5.27, SD = 1.34 versus M = 5.37, SD = 1.37, p =
.426). However, contrary to Hypothesis 2, perceptions of source worthiness of the corporate
source significantly decreased in the congruent message condition in which the corporate source
advocated the pro-business message (M = 3.01, SD = 1.16 versus M = 2.40, SD = 1.03), M =
diff

.609, p = .018, 95% CI [.113, 1.11], see Figure 4.
The various source-message combinations also produced significant changes in the
evaluations of trustworthiness of the source’s outgroup. For example, when the environmental
source advocated the pro-environmental (congruent) message, evaluations of trustworthiness of
the corporation (outgroup) significantly decreased between pre-message (M = 3.70, SD = 1.79)
and post-message measures (M = 3.34, SD = 1.75), M = .353, p = .01, 95% CI [.079, .627].
diff

However, when the environmental source advocated the pro-business message, evaluations of
corporate trustworthiness did not change between pre-message (M = 3.18) and post-message (M
= 3.10) measures, p = .615. When the corporate source advocated the pro-business message,
evaluations of trust in the outgroup environmental organization significantly increased between
pre-message (M = 5.26, SD = 0.86) and post-message measures (M = 5.52, SD = 1.01), (M = diff

.266, p < .05, 95% CI [-.514, -.018]. When the corporate source advocated the proenvironmental message, evaluations of trustworthiness of the environmental organization
(outgroup) also increased between pre-message (M = 5.29, SD = 0.89) and post-message
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measures (M = 5.46, SD = 0.99), though it did not quite reach statistical significance (M = diff

.171, p = .07, 95% CI [-.354, .013].
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Figure 4. Source trustworthiness as a function of source, message, and time. Note: higher scores
indicate higher levels of trust.
Support for Risk Management
Results also revealed a two-way interaction between source and time for support for risk
management. Overall, regardless of message advocated, the corporate source elicited an
significant increase in support for risk management between pre-message (M = 3.26, SD = 1.55)
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and post-message measures (M = 3.61, SD = 1.80), M = -.341, p = .03, 95% CI [ -.646, -.035].
diff

The environmental source did not lead to a change in reported support for risk management
between the pre- and post-message (M = 3.22, SD = 1.64 versus M = 3.12, SD = 1.62,
respectively, p = .35).
Simple effects test of the two-way interaction between message and time revealed that
when the pro-environmental message was advocated, support for risk management significantly
increased between pre-message (M = 3.60, SD = 1.72) and post-message measures (M = 3.91, SD
= 1.74), M = -.314, p = .01, 95% CI [ -.561, -.067]. When the pro-business message was
diff

advocated, regardless of the source, there was no change between pre-message and post-message
measures of support for risk management (M = 2.82, SD = 1.31 versus M = 2.69, SD = 1.45,
respectively, p = .36).
The significant three-way interaction between source, message, and time subsumes and
clarifies the two-way interactions. In the incongruent condition in which the corporate source
advocated the pro-environmental position, support for risk management significantly increased
between pre-message (M = 3.65, SD = 1.66) and post-message measures (M = 4.45, SD = 1.61),
M = -0.80, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.14, -.456], supporting Hypothesis 4. However, contrary to
diff

what was expected in Hypothesis 4, in the incongruent condition in which the environmental
source advocated the pro-business condition, there was no change between pre-message and
post-message measures of support for risk management (M = 2.86, SD = 1.38 versus M = 2.85,
SD = 1.75, respectively, p = .94). As expected, neither of the congruent conditions produced
significant changes in the support for risk management between pre-message and post-message
measures (M = 2.76, SD = 1.25 versus M = 2.50, SD = 1.42, p = .28 for the corporate source/pro-
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business message condition and M = 3.55, SD = 1. 81 versus M = 3.38, SD = 1. 73, p = .24 for
the environmentalist source/pro-environmental message condition). See Figure 5.

Figure 5. Support for risk management as a function of source, message, and time. Note: higher
scores indicate more support for risk management.
Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the influence of source-message incongruence on
attitudes, perceived risk, corporate and environmental source trustworthiness, and support for
risk management. Results of correlational analyses revealed some notable relationships among
the dependent variables. In line with prior research in the risk management and communication
literatures, there was a positive relationship between attitudes and perceived risk. Additionally,
affirming what risk communication literatures have established regarding the relationship
between trust and perceived risk, results indicated perceived risk was positively correlated with
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environmental source trustworthiness, and negatively correlated with corporate source
trustworthiness and support for risk management. Attitudes and political ideology were
negatively correlated, such that the more conservative one’s political ideology, the less they
aligned with the pro-environmental position regarding Superfund (and, thus the more they
aligned with the pro-business position). In addition, participants with more environmental
concern. Similarly, there was a significant positive correlation between political ideology and
both corporate source trustworthiness and support for risk management: participants reporting
more conservative political leanings reported more trust in the corporate source, and more
support for risk management.
Study 1 hypothesized that that sources advocating incongruent message positions (i.e.,
environmentalist advocating the pro-business message and corporate source advocating the proenvironmental message) would lead to more positive attitudes toward their message position, and
be rated more trustworthy than sources advocating congruent messages. It was also expected that
perceptions of risk would decrease, and support for risk management would increase in the
incongruent, compared to the congruent conditions.
The data support Hypothesis 1—the incongruent source-message conditions (for both
source-message combinations) were more persuasive than the congruent source-message
conditions, and led to significant attitude shifts in the expected directions. As expected, when the
corporate source advocated a pro-environmental message, there was a significant change in
attitudes: respondents’ attitudes toward the Superfund designation significantly increased, i.e.,
moved toward the advocated, pro-environmental message position, though the difference was
only marginally significant (p = .08). Likewise, when the environmental source advocated the
pro-business, position, attitudes toward the Superfund designation decreased, i.e., moved toward
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the pro-business position. Comparisons of Time 2 measures did not show a significant
interaction between source and message type on attitudes—in other words,
Hypothesis 2 only received partial support. In the incongruous condition in which a
corporate source advocated a pro-environmental message position, source trustworthiness was
enhanced, as expected, However, in the incongruent source-message combination in which an
environmentalist source advocated the pro-business message position, evaluations of source
trustworthiness decreased between time points, rather than increased as hypothesized.
Hypothesis 3 was not supported—perceptions of risk associated with the Wagner
Laboratory site did not differ across the various source-message conditions, either when
comparing Time 1 and Time 2 measure, nor when examining only Time 2 measures across
conditions.
Hypothesis 4 was only partially supported. The corporate source advocating the proenvironmental (incongruent) message influenced (increased) reported support for risk
management but the incongruent message from the environmentalist source did not similarly
affect support for risk management. This make sense since the corporate source in this scenario
was also part of the risk management.
Because respondents evaluated the trustworthiness of both the corporate and
environmental organizations, regardless of the source who delivered the experimental message, it
was possible to examine the evaluations of trustworthiness for the organizational “outgroup.”
The newspaper article described the environmental group as a critic of the cleanup that was
underway by the corporation, setting up the environmental group and corporation as being at
odds with each other. Exploratory analyses were conducting to examine these effects. In line
with the pro-environmental bias observed in this study, when the environmental source
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advocated the pro-environmental message, evaluations of corporate source trustworthiness
significantly decreased. Yet, when the corporate source advocated the pro-business message,
evaluations of source trustworthiness of the environmental group were enhanced. Interestingly,
when the corporate source advocated the pro-environmental message, not only were evaluations
of his own (corporate source) trustworthiness significantly enhanced, but trust in the
environmental source also increased significantly between pre-message and post-message
measures. It is possible that when trust in a communicator is bolstered by incongruent sourcemessage pairings, the sense of trust may be strong enough to influence evaluations of trust of
other relevant parties.
These results suggest that violations of expectancies -- or unexpected source-message
pairings -- can enhance persuasiveness. However, they may only increase perceptions of
trustworthiness when their message is positive, or in accord with existing attitudes. In cases in
which the message is negative, incongruent source-message pairings may have a boomerang
effect and lead to significantly reduced perceptions of trustworthiness.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Study 2
Previous research examining the effect of incongruent source-message pairings on
message processing has produced mixed results. Some studies have found increased elaboration
associated with surprising or unexpected source-message combinations; others have observed
decreased elaboration. The primary purpose of Experiment 2 was to provide evidence to help
clarify how incongruent messages impact processing in an environmental risk communication
context. In addition, it provided an opportunity to replicate re-test the impact of congruent and
incongruent messages on attitudes, source trustworthiness, and support for risk management.
Study 2 utilized the same risk management scenario as Study 1.
Hypothesis 5: Taking into account the covariates (environmental concern and political
beliefs, and need for cognition), participants in conditions in which sources advocate
incongruous messages (i.e., corporate source advocating pro-environmental message and
environmental activist advocating a pro-business message) will be more persuaded by the
message regarding the Superfund designation, compared to congruous message conditions.
Hypothesis 6: Taking into account the covariates, participants in conditions in which
sources advocate incongruous messages will report significantly more positive source
trustworthiness evaluations compared to congruous message conditions.
Hypothesis 7: Taking into account the covariates, participants in conditions in which
sources advocate incongruous messages will report significantly stronger support for risk
management compared to when congruous messages are advocated.
Hypothesis 8: Taking into account the covariates, a statistically significant interaction
between source type and message type on cognitive elaboration is expected, such that
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participants exposed to sources advocating incongruous messages are expected to report
significantly different levels of cognitive elaboration than participants exposed to sources
advocating congruous messages. Based on the conflicting findings in past research regarding
message processing, no predictions were made as to the direction of the difference.
Method
Participants
Participants included 240 adults (aged 18 and over) recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk to participate in a study hosted by Qualtrics, an online survey platform. They were offered
$1.00 for their participation and told it would take approximately 10-15 minutes of their time.
The sample was restricted to U.S. citizens because two of the three independent variables were
delivered in a scenario-based manipulation related to U.S. environmental policy. From the initial
sample of 240 respondents, 72 cases (30%) were removed from the analyses: 29 respondents
(12.0%) were removed because they did not complete the survey, three respondents (1.1%) were
removed because they were located outside of the U.S., seven people (2.9%) responded to the
data quality measure that their data should not be used in the analysis, and 33 people (13.8%)
were excluded for failing the manipulation checks. The final data set was comprised of 168
respondents.
The final sample (N = 168) was heavily male (62.7%), and predominantly Caucasian
(74.6% Caucasian, 7.7% Hispanic/Latino, 6.5% Black/African American, 4.7% Asian/Pacific
Islander, 4.1% Native American/Alaskan Native, and 2.4% Mixed Race). The average age was
39 (M = 39.08, SD = 12.89) and most participants had at least some college experience (8.9%
high school diploma, 16.6% some college no degree, 14.8% Associate degree, 47.9% Bachelor’s
degree, 8.9% Master’s degree, 1.2% Doctoral degree, and 1.8% professional degree). In terms of
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political ideology, the sample leaned somewhat left (M = 3.02, SD = 2.19) and 47.3% identified
as Democrat, 29% as Republican, 21.9% as Independent, and 1.8% as Other.
Design and Procedure
The study employed a 2 (source type: corporate risk manager vs. environmental activist)
X 2 (message position: pro-environmental versus pro-business) between-groups factorial design.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four source-message conditions via a scenariobased manipulation.
Participants were told they would participate in a survey regarding environmental
contamination and cleanup. They were told about the Wagner Laboratory’s potential designation
as a Superfund site, as in Study 1, and read the same newspaper article and background
information about Superfund, and received the same experimental manipulations.
Manipulated Variables
Source type. Steve Fields, was described as either the cleanup project manager for the
Wagner Aerospace Corporation, owner of the potential Superfund site, or the president of
Friends of the Environment, a nonprofit organization committed to the protection of the
environment and public health.
Message position. Steve Fields was quoted as either strongly supporting (proenvironmental) or strongly opposing (pro-business) the Superfund designation of the Wagner
Laboratory.
Measures
Environmental concern. Prior to reading the experimental messages, respondents were
asked to answer a series of questions about their thoughts and feelings toward the Earth and the
environment. Participants completed the 15-item (α = .91) revised New Environmental Paradigm
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scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). Sample items include “Humans have
the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs,” “Humans are seriously abusing
the environment,” and “The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly
exaggerated.”
Need for cognition. Because previous research (e.g., Priester & Petty, 1995) suggests that
an individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking (i.e., need for cognition) influences the
extent to which they engage in the cognitive elaboration of messages, participants completed an
18-item (α = .93) Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984). Participants completed this measure after completing the NEP scale, prior to being
exposed to the experimental messages.
Cognitive elaboration. After reading the entire newspaper article, participants were asked
to respond to a 12-item Likert Scale (1-7; Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) modified from
Reynolds (1997), assessing how much effort they expended in processing Steve Fields’ message
(α = .91). This method was chosen over other common measures of elaboration to simplify the
measure given the online research context (see Barden & Tormala, 2014; Wegener, Downing,
Krosnick, & Petty, 1995). The scale items included: “When I was reading Steve Fields’
statement on the Superfund designation, I was…” (1) attempting to analyze the issues in the
message, (2) not very attentive to the message, (3) deep in thought about the message, (4)
unconcerned with the message, (5) extending a good deal of cognitive effort, (6) distracted by
other thoughts not related to the message, (7) not really exerting my mind, (8) doing my best to
think about the message, (9) reflecting on the implications of the message, (10) resting my mind,
(11) searching my mind in response to the message ideas, and (12) taking it easy. Items
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Source trustworthiness. Respondents completed a six-item, 7-point semantic differential
scale evaluating the trustworthiness of both Friends of the Environment (α = .96), and Wagner
Aerospace Corporation (α=.96) organizations. Scale anchors were: negative/positive, does not
care about me/cares about me, not credible/credible, biased/unbiased, bad/good, and
untrustworthy/trustworthy.
Attitudes. To measure attitudes, participants then gave their opinion about the Superfund
designation by responding to a 7-point scale ranging from 1-“oppose Superfund designation” to
7-“support Superfund designation.” In addition, they responded to a six-item, 7-point semantic
differential scale with the following anchors: bad/good, unfavorable/favorable,
harmful/beneficial, worthless/valuable foolish/wise, and unfair/fair. The seven items were
combined into a single measure (α = .97).
Manipulation check and data quality measures. After reading the newspaper article
containing the experimental manipulations, participants were asked to report (depending on
condition) either Wagner Aerospace Corporation or Friends of the Environment’s position
regarding the Superfund designation on a Likert-type scale (1-7; Oppose Superfund designation
to Support Superfund designation). Participants also reported whether their attention to the study
was adequate to produce accurate responses. It was acknowledged that some people get
distracted during surveys and are not able to respond thoughtfully, and participants responded to
the following yes/no question: Without penalty (you will still receive compensation for your
time), please tell us -- should we use the data from your responses?”
Support for risk management. Participants rated their trust in “Wagner Aerospace
Corporation management” to effectively manage the contamination from Wagner Laboratory site.
Responses were given on a scale ranging from 1-“strongly disagree” to 7-“strongly agree” (α =
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.97). The six scale items were: “I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to: (1)
effectively manage the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site, (2) provide the best
available information on the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site, (3) provide me with
enough information to decide what actions I should take regarding the contamination from the
Wagner Laboratory site, (4) provide me with truthful information about the contamination from
the Wagner Laboratory site, (5) provide me with timely information the contamination from the
Wagner Laboratory site, (6) to make wise decisions regarding the cleanup of the Wagner
Laboratory site.
Political Ideology. Participants indicated their current political ideology on a 2-item Likert
Scale (1-7; left/right and liberal/conservative; α = .90). Lower scores indicate more liberal political
leanings and higher scores indicate more conservative political leanings.
Demographics. Participant background information was collected, including age, sex,
education level, and ethnicity. Participants also reported their political party affiliation (Democrat,
Republican, Independent, Other). See Appendix C for all Study 2 Measures. See also Table 2 for
descriptives and correlations among all scales.
Table 2
Study 2 Variables: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (N=165)
Measure
1 Attitudes
2 Corporate source
trustworthiness
3 Environmental source
trustworthiness

1
1

2
-.127

3
.605**

4
-.363**

5
.140

6
.149

7
.343**

8
-.490**

1

-.116

.836**

-.194

.106

-.381**

.120

1

-.233*

.234*

.383**

-.333**
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.017

4 Support for risk
management

1

-.247**

5 Cognitive elaboration

1

6 Need for cognition

.048 -.498**

.228*

.294**

.329**

-.014

1

-.005

-.093

7 Environmental concern

1

-.485**

8 Political ideology
Measure

1

M

1
5.48

2
4.13

3
5.23

4
4.00

5
5.51

6
4.57

7
4.86

8
3.28

SD

1.39

1.61

1.14

1.69

1.03

0.91

1.11

2.09

α

.97

.96

.96

.97

.91

.93

.91

.90

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Results
Correlational Analyses
As in Study 1, attitudes were significantly, positively correlated with environmental
source trustworthiness (r = .605, p < .01). Attitudes and environmental concern were also
positively correlated (r = .343, p < .01), indicating that the more environmental concern, the
more positive their attitudes toward the Superfund designation (pro-environmental position).
Additionally, attitudes significantly, positively correlated with environmental source
trustworthiness, such that the greater the trust, the more positive the attitude toward the
Superfund designation (r = .605, p < .01). There was also a significant, negative correlation
between attitudes and political ideology, such that the further right, or more conservative
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participants reported bring, the weaker their attitudes toward the Superfund designation (the probusiness position; r = - .490, p < .01). Unlike Study 1, there was a significant, negative
relationship between attitudes and support for risk management: the more positive attitudes
toward the Superfund designation, the less support for risk management. As expected, cognitive
elaboration and need for cognition were positively correlated (r = .294, p < .01). Additionally,
there was a significant negative relationship between environmental concern and political
ideology, indicating that greater environmental concern was related to more liberal political
ideology, as reported by participants.
Source and Message Effects
A two-way MANCOVA was performed in which source type (environmental activist vs.
corporate risk manager) and message position (pro-environmental versus pro-business) were
entered as fixed factors and scores on the NEP scale, the NC scale, and political ideology were
entered as covariates. Dependent variables included attitudes, source trustworthiness, support for
risk management, and cognitive elaboration. The overall multivariate test revealed a significant
main effect of source type, F(5, 153) = 6.60, p < .001; Pillai’s Trace = .178, partial η = .106, and
2

a significant main effect of message type, F(5, 153) = 10.86, p < .001; Pillai’s Trace = .262,
partial η = .262. It also showed a significant interaction between source time and message type,
2

whilst controlling for need for cognition, environmental concern, and political ideology, F(5,
153) = 2.97, p = .004; Pillai’s Trace = .106, partial η = .106.
2

Tests of between-subjects effects showed the main effect of source type was significant
for corporate source trustworthiness, F(1, 164) = 28.71, p < .001, partial η = .155, environmental
2

source trustworthiness, F(1, 164) = 4.45, p < .05, partial η = .028, and support for risk
2

management, F(1, 164) = 16.40, p < .001, partial η = .095. It was not significant for attitudes (p
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= .63) or cognitive elaboration (p = .95). The main effect of message type, on the other hand was
significant for attitudes, F(1, 164) = 15.84, p < .001, partial η = .092, corporate source
2

trustworthiness, F(1, 164) = 14.42, p < .001, partial η = .084, environmental source
2

trustworthiness, F(1, 164) = 7.94, p < .01, partial η = .048, and cognitive elaboration, F(1, 164)
2

= 10.17, p < .01, partial η = .061. The effect did not reach statistical significance for support for
2

risk management, F(1, 164) = 3.23, p = .07, partial η = .020.
2

The interaction between source type and message type was significant for corporate
source trustworthiness, F(1, 164) = 17.31, p < .001, partial η = .099, and support for risk
2

management F(1, 164) = 6.79, p = .01, partial η = .041, but it was not significant for attitudes (p
2

= .49), environmental source trustworthiness (p = .71), or cognitive elaboration of messages (p =
.71).
Attitudes
A main effect of message type showed that the pro-environmental message produced
significantly more support for the Superfund designation (M = 5.88, SE = .134) than the probusiness message (M = 5.10, SD = .142), M = .782, p < .001, 95% CI [.394, 1.17]. This effect
diff

is expected, given that the pro-environmental message advocated for support for the Superfund
designation, whereas the pro-business message advocated against the Superfund designation.
There was no main effect of source on attitudes (p = .63). Of central interest to this research was
the question of whether incongruent versus congruent source-message combinations would
produce differences in attitudes regarding the Superfund designation. Contrary to the
expectations of Hypothesis 5, there was no significant interaction between source type and
message type (p = .49) on attitudes. In other words, incongruent conditions were no more
persuasive than the congruent message conditions.
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Source Trustworthiness
Results revealed the main effect of source type was significant for both corporate and
environmental sources. Regardless of message type, the corporate source produced significantly
more trustworthiness in the corporate source (M = 4.04, SE = .146) than the environmental
source (M = 2.95, SE = .140), M = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI [.686, 1.49]. The environmental
diff

source, regardless of message type, also produced significantly more trustworthiness in the
corporate source (M = 5.25, SE = .137) than the environmental source (M = 4.85, SE = .132),
M = .403, p < .05, 95% CI [.026, .781]. Hypothesis 6 was only partially supported: the two-way
diff

interaction between source type and message was only significant for corporate source
trustworthiness. Simple effects of this interaction effect reveal that a corporate source advocating
a pro-environmental message was viewed as significantly more trustworthy (M = 4.88, SE =
.202) than when advocating the pro-business message (M = 3.28, SE = .216), M = 1.59, p <
diff

.001, 95% CI [.996, 2.19]. There was no significant difference in evaluations of corporate source
trustworthiness when the environmental source advocated a pro-environmental message versus
the pro-business message (p = .92).
Support for Risk Management
There was a main effect of source type on support for risk management, such that,
regardless of the message advocated, the corporate source produced significantly more support
for risk management (M = 3.92, SE = .161) compared to the environmental source, (M = 3.01, SE
= .155), M = .906, p < .001, 95% CI [.464, 1.35]. Results also showed a significant interaction
diff

between source and message on support for risk management, providing partial support for
Hypothesis 7: when a corporate source advocated a pro-environmental message, support for risk
management was significantly stronger (M = 4.59) compared to the when the pro-business
59

message was advocated (M = 3.36). The incongruent condition with the environmental source,
however, did not produce significantly different amounts of support for risk management.
Cognitive Elaboration
The main effect of message type showed that participants exerted more cognitive effort in
the pro-business message condition overall, in which they received a message arguing against the
Superfund designation (M = 5.75, SE = 0.10) compared to the pro-environmental message
condition, in which the message advocated in favor of the Superfund designation (M = 5.30, SE
= 0.10), Mdiff = - .454, p = .002, 95% CI [ -.735, .173]. There was no main effect for source (F(1,
161) = .006, p = .940, partial η2 = .000) and no interaction between source and message (F(1,
161) = .097, p = .76, partial η2 = .001), therefore Hypothesis 8 was not supported.
Covariate Effects
A multiple regression was run to predict self-reported cognitive elaboration from
environmental concern, political ideology, and need for cognition. For self-reported cognitive
elaboration, the multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted cognitive
elaboration, F(3,163) = 9.94, p < .001. All three variables added statistically significantly to the
prediction, p < .05. Regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Cognitive Elaboration
Variable
Constant

B
2.29

SEB
0.609

β

Environmental
0.300
0.078
0.320**
Concern
Political Belief
0.083
0.040
0.174*
Need for Cognition
0.323
0.079
0.297**
Note. *p < .05, **p < .001, B = unstandardized regression coefficient; SEB = Standard error
of the coefficient; β = standardized coefficient
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The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted attitudes toward the
Superfund designation, F(3,163) = 18.65, p < .001. Political belief added statistically
significantly to the prediction, p < .001, as expected. However, contrary to expectations,
environmental concern was not quite statistically significant, t = 1.67, p = .10.
The multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted corporate source
trustworthiness, F(3,163) = 9.75, p < .001. Environmental concern added statistically
significantly to the prediction, t = -3.55, p = .001, as expected. However, contrary to
expectations, political ideology did not significantly add to the prediction, t = .523, p = .60.
Similarly, the model predicted environmental source trustworthiness, F(3,163) = 8.46, p < .001.
Environmental concern added statistically significantly to the prediction, t = 2.94, p < .01, as
expected. However, contrary to expectations, political ideology did not significantly add to the
prediction, t = -1.04, p = .30.
Finally, the multiple regression model statistically significantly predicted support for risk
management, F(3,163) = 17.81, p < .001. All three variables added statistically significantly to
the prediction, p < .001 Environmental concern added statistically significantly to the prediction,
t = -4.87, p < .001, as expected. However, political ideology did not, t = .570, p = .57.
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to provide clarity as to how much cognitive elaboration
individuals undertake when exposed to (in)congruent messages of both environmentalist and
corporate sources in an environmental risk communication context. It also sought to examine the
predictive role of covariates, including environmental concern, political ideology, and need for
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cognition on attitudes, corporate and environmental source trustworthiness, and cognitive
elaboration.
Although Study 1 uncovered significant source-message incongruence effects on
attitudes, such that incongruent conditions produced more attitude change than congruent
message conditions, Study 2 was not able to support this finding. There was no difference in the
persuasiveness of the four source-message combinations, therefore Hypothesis 5 was not
supported. It is possible that the current study did not have the power provided by pre- and postmessage measures to detect the effects of attitude change. Results only found partial support for
Hypothesis 6. As predicted, when the corporate source advocated an incongruent message,
perceptions of their source trustworthiness was enhanced. However, similar to Study 1 findings,
the trustworthiness of the environmental source was not enhanced when advocating an
incongruent message. This result suggests that positive violations of expectancies are superior to
negative expectancy violations when it comes to changing attitudes. Similarly, Hypothesis 7
received only partial support: incongruent source-message pairings influenced support for risk
management only in the incongruent conditions in which the corporate source advocated the proenvironmental message.
With regard to the effect of incongruous source-message pairings on elaboration of
messages, the results contradicted expectations. The incongruous source-message pairings did
not differ significantly from congruous combinations; therefore Hypothesis 8 was not supported.
However, there was an unexpected, significant main effect of message type. Specifically,
regardless of source type, participants engaged in significantly more cognitive elaboration when
the pro-business message position was advocated compared to when the pro-environmental
message position was advocated. This result suggests that message content may influence
62

cognitive elaboration more than source variables in certain contexts. In light of the initial bias in
attitudes toward the environmental position, these results suggest the possibility that
counterattitudinal messages are elaborated more deeply than proattitudinal messages. This is
consistent with previous research suggesting that coutnerattitudinal information elicits more
processing than proattitudinal messages because they can threaten the receiver’s attitude
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1979).
Results also demonstrate that environmental concern, political belief, and need for
cognition are important predictors of cognitive elaboration in this context. Correlational analyses
suggest that more environmental concern is significantly, positively correlated with self-reported
cognitive elaboration: the stronger the environmental concern, the more cognitive elaboration
reported by participants. This is consistent with previous research (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, &
Goldman, 1981). Also, as would be expected, participants with greater need for cognition
reported more cognitive elaboration. Political ideology significantly correlated negatively with
attitudes, support for environmental risk management, and environmental concern, indicating
that participants reporting more liberal political leanings had stronger pro-environmental
tendencies, while more conservative participants had more pro-business tendencies. Regression
analyses of the covariates indicated that political ideology, but not environmental concern was a
significant predictor of attitudes toward Superfund designation. Political belief was not a
significant predictor of corporate or environmental source trustworthiness, or support for risk
management, but environmental concern was.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
General Discussion
The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of congruent versus incongruent
messages on attitudes, source evaluation, perceived risk, and trust in risk management,
associated with a hypothetical hazardous waste cleanup. The research also sought to shed light
on the psychological processes behind the effects of source-message (in)congruence by
examining how the source type and message congruence variables influence the self-reported
cognitive elaboration of messages. An environmental risk management scenario was used to
implement the research studies, extending the application of source-message incongruence
effects into a new context. The findings help clarify some existing research as well as raise
additional questions for future research.
Previous research suggests that incongruous source-message combinations can lead to
attitude change by enhancing the credibility of the message (e.g., Koeske and Crano, 1968) or
messenger (e.g., Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; McPeek and Edwards, 1975; Petty, Fleming,
Priester, & Feinstein, 2001; Priester & Petty, 1995). The first research question focused on how
congruent and incongruent source-message pairings impact attitudes, and source trustworthiness.
Previous research did not consistently find effects for both source trustworthiness and attitudes.
The current research sought to clarify the conditions that led to both enhanced source
trustworthiness and attitude change by measuring and taking into account environmental
concern, via the NEP scale, and political ideology. In addition, given the relationship between
trust, perceived risk, and support for risk management, this research aimed to test whether these
variables would vary between incongruent and congruent source-message combinations. Based
on previous research in this area and the AAP (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Eagly, Chaiken, &
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Wood, 1981; Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Wood & Eagly, 1981), Study 1 hypotheses
predicted that incongruent source-message combinations would elicit significant changes
between time points along the following measures: attitude toward advocated position, source
trustworthiness, perceived risk, and support for risk management. Specifically, participants were
expected to display significant changes in attitudes toward the advocated message position,
increased perceptions of trustworthiness of the source of the message, decreased levels of
perceived risk, and higher levels of support for risk management in the post-message measures
compared to the pre-message measures when receiving a message from an incongruous source,
compared to a congruous source, while taking into account environmental concern and political
ideology covariates. Study 1 tested these hypotheses.
The results provided only partial support for the hypotheses. When the corporate source
advocated a pro-environmental message position, respondents’ perceptions of the source’s
trustworthiness significantly increased between pre- and post-message measures compared to
when he advocated the pro-business (congruent) message. Respondents’ attitudes also changed
in the direction of the advocated message, though the result only reached marginal significance.
Participants’ support for risk management also significantly increased with this source-message
combination, though there was no change in perceived risk.
Results were slightly different for the incongruent condition in which the environmental
source advocated the pro-business message position. With this combination, respondents’
attitudes changed significantly between pre- and post-message measures in the direction of the
advocated message compared to when the source advocated the congruent message, as expected,
but their evaluations of trustworthiness also decreased significantly. This was opposite of what
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was expected with regard to source trustworthiness where an enhancement effect was
hypothesized.
One possible explanation for this result of no enhanced trustworthiness is that the
corporate message was viewed more negatively than the environmental message. Although
evaluations of the messages themselves were not measured, an overall bias toward the
environmental position was revealed in pre-message attitudes measures. The mean attitude score
was 5.65 on a 7-point scale, where higher scores indicated more support for the environmental
message position. Analysis of pre-message evaluations also indicated a bias in favor of the
environmentalist source compared to the corporate source. Pre-message measures of both
corporate and environmental sources indicated that the environmentalist source was perceived
initially as more trustworthy than the corporate source. Thus, when a (trustworthy)
environmentalist source advocates the corporate message, in addition to being incongruent, it is
rather undesirable. It is possible that for incongruence to enhance source trustworthiness, the
message advocated must be viewed as positive, or desirable. In the communication literature,
expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1993, Burgoon & Jones, 1976) distinguishes between
positive and negative expectancy violations. The theory suggests that violation valences depend
on the evaluation of an enacted behavior (in the current context, the message) and whether the
discrepancy between the expected and actual behavior (message) is toward a more favorable or
unfavorable position. In the context of this research, the more favorable position would
presumably be the one in line with prior attitudes. Expectancy violation theory research indicates
that negative expectancy violations are associated with reduced liking and credibility (J. Burgoon
& LePoire, 1993); however, source-message incongruence studies, including the AAP, have not
similarly taken into consideration message valence.
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It is also possible that evaluations of trustworthiness of the environmentalist source
decreased, rather than increased when advocating the incongruent, corporate message due to the
advocacy of the corporate message being viewed as a violation of a group’s interest, rather than
individual interest. Petty et al. (2001) showed that only a violation of self-interest is associated
with increased perceptions of trustworthiness. When a communicator violates the interest of his
or her group, although at some level they are violating their own self-interest, the group violation
may be viewed as disloyalty to the group. Because shared group identity is an important basis for
trust (e.g., Kramer, Brewer, and Hanna, 1996), it is plausible the perception of disloyalty may
decrease perceptions of trustworthiness. In the context of the current study, it is possible that
when the environmental source advocated the corporate message position, that advocacy was
seen more as a violation of the group’s (Friends of the Environment’s) interest. After all, the
group was described as an environmental advocacy group. There was perhaps less distinction
between the corporate source as an individual and the larger corporate organization (Wagner
Aerospace Corporation). In this way, the corporate source’s advocacy for the environmental
position could be viewed more as a violation of their own interest, and thus explain how
corporate trustworthiness increased in the incongruent condition.
In spite of the questions raised by this research about the effects of source-message
incongruence on source trustworthiness, the impacts on attitudes are remarkable: sources
advocating incongruent versus congruent message positions were more persuasive, regardless of
message valence, and regardless of whether source trustworthiness was enhanced. Study 1 results
indicated that the most persuasive source-message combination was the environmentalist source
advocating the pro-business message --the same combination that reduced, rather than enhanced
evaluations of source trustworthiness. The next most persuasive message condition was the other
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incongruent combination in which the corporate source advocated the pro-environmental
message—similar to what Koeske and Crano (1968) found, and suggests that source
trustworthiness is not necessary for attitude change to take place.
When a communicator (either source) advocated an incongruent message, respondents
did not significantly alter their perceptions of risk, even when source trustworthiness was
enhanced, as predicted. This is somewhat surprising considering the consistent association
between trust and perceived risk that has consistently been found in the risk management
literature (e.g., Flynn, Burns, Mertz, & Slovic, 1992; Leiss, 1996; Ryu, Kim, & Kim, 2018;
Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000), Indeed, perceived risk was positively correlated with
environmental source trustworthiness, and negatively correlated with corporate source
trustworthiness and support for risk management, as prior research has indicated, but corporate
source trustworthiness only accounted for about 8% of the variance in perceived risk. Apparently
the enhancement of credibility of the corporate source, and even support for risk management
(i.e., the corporation’s handling of the cleanup) when advocating an incongruent message is
tapping into a different psychological aspect of trust than that related to perceived risk.
The second experiment attempted to replicate the findings from Study 1 regarding
source-message (in)congruence on attitudes and source trustworthiness, as well as extend the
investigation by examining the effects of source-message effects on reported cognitive
elaboration. It was expected that the incongruent source-message combinations would elicit
significantly different amounts of cognitive elaboration than participants exposed to sources
advocating congruous messages. The effects of source-message incongruence matched Study 1
for the condition in which the corporate source advocated the pro-environmental message,
however, unlike with Study 1, there was no “boomerang” effect for the environmental source
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advocating the pro-business message. Study 1 found source trustworthiness significantly
decreased in this scenario, but in Study 2, there was no difference. The attitudes results also
failed the replication test. source message incongruence did not influence attitudes. The lack of
replication with attitudes may be due to the fact that Study 2 did not have pre- and post-message
measures like Study 1 and thus did not have as much power to detect differences.
Contrary to expectations there was no significant interaction between source and message
on cognitive elaboration. Respondents in the two incongruent source-message conditions did not
differ significantly in their elaboration compared to the two congruent conditions. It is possible
that the reduction in sample size resulting from participants failing manipulation checks or not
meeting qualifications inhibited the ability to detect interaction effects. Furthermore, given
previous mixed results, it is possible that individual differences or other psychological processes
predispose some people to elaborate more when encountering an incongruent message, and
others to elaborate less. Null results would be expected if this were the case.
Although no interaction effect was found, unexpectedly, a main effect for message type
emerged, such that regardless of the source, when the corporate message position was advocated,
participants engaged in significantly more cognitive elaboration than when the environmental
message position was advocated. Study 2 did not have pre-message measures that could be used
to measure baseline attitudes, as in Study 1, but given the similar sampling method, it is likely
that the participants overall held similar initial attitudes toward Superfund. If that were the case,
it could be speculated that the significantly more elaboration for the corporate message were due
to the negative valence of the advocacy. Indeed, prior research suggests that counterattitudinal
information elicits more processing than proattitudinal messages (Cacioppo and Petty, 1979).
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Correlational analyses suggest that more environmental concern significantly correlated
with self-reported cognitive elaboration: the stronger the environmental concern, the more
cognitive elaboration reported by participants. This is consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) suggesting personal involvement enhances elaboration.
Conclusions
The findings from this research suggest that source-message incongruence can lead to
attitude change and increased perceptions of trustworthiness, but an audience’s initial attitudes
and the valence of the message contents must be considered. In situations where a source
advocates an incongruent message that is in line with prior attitudes, perceptions of source
trustworthiness can be enhanced; however, if the message is counterattitudinal, it can
significantly decrease perceptions of trustworthiness. Notably, this dissertation shows that
attitude change can still effectively occur when the trustworthiness of the source is diminished,
and despite source-message incongruence not influencing the elaboration of messages. This
dissertation also highlights the importance of taking into account the personal relevance of an
issue for the audience.
Limitations and Future Research
Some limitations of this research are worth noting. First, the use of Mturk has inherent
limitations in that respondents tend to be more educated, less religious, younger and higher in
socioeconomic status than the general population (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011;
Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), so the generalizability of results is limited. It is possible
that the online platform impeded participant engagement, which would have impacts especially
in relation to the message processing portions of the research. Another limitation is that the
repeated measures were collected without much time in between. Future research should
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examine whether the incongruence effects held up over a longer period of time. Another issue
was the inherent problem that the corporate source was also the risk manager. Therefore, the
support for risk management variable was not easily untangled from the corporate source
trustworthiness variable.
In addition, despite the attempt to measure and take into account personal relevance via
environmental concern, the central issue at hand--the designation of the fictional Wagner
Laboratory site as a Superfund site--did not have personally relevant consequences. It would be
beneficial for future research to examine or manipulate the vested interest of study participants to
establish how it influences source-message incongruence. This would be especially beneficial for
environmental risk management research, as real-world risk management scenarios typically
involve individuals with some sort of stake in the environmental situation at hand. Finally, in
light of the context of this research, and the presumed expertise of the sources, future research
should test the ability of source-message incongruence to change attitudes when sources are
clearly not experts.
Applications for Risk Management
The results from this dissertation may be useful for environmental risk managers and
communication practitioners as they engage with and communicate with stakeholders. First,
from a risk management perspective, this research illustrates the benefit of engaging with
stakeholders and allowing them to be part of the decision-making process. This research showed
that when people have positive attitudes toward a potential environmental solution, they were
more likely to trust the source and support risk management, even when initially they evaluated a
source to be untrustworthy. In spite of the research showing that trustworthiness is not an
essential component to attitude change, environmental risk managers and communicators should
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always strive to cultivate trust with stakeholders. In the long run, trust fosters an environment
where an interactive exchange of information can take place between decision makers and
stakeholders.
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Appendix A
Experimental Manipulation
All conditions received the same page 1, below
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Condition 1: Environmental Source-Corporate Message Position
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Condition 2: Environmental Source-Environmental Message Position
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Condition 3: Corporate Source-Environmental Message Position
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Condition 4: Corporate Source-Corporate Message Position
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Appendix B
Study 1 Measures
New Environmental Paradigm Scale (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the Earth can support.
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. (Rev)
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the Earth unlivable. (Rev)
5. Humans are seriously abusing the environment.
6. The Earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. (Rev)
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
(Rev)
9. Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. (Rev)
11. The Earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.
12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. (Rev)
13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. (Rev)
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological
catastrophe.
Attitudes
Based on the information that you have been provided so far, please select the circle that most
closely corresponds to your own view regarding the designation of the Wagner Laboratory as a
Superfund site. (7-point)
I oppose the Superfund designation—I support the Superfund designation
Designating the Wagner Laboratory as a Superfund site is: (7-point)
Bad—Good
Dumb—Smart
Harmful—Beneficial
Worthless—Valuable
Unwise—Wise
Source Evaluation - completed for both environmentalist and corporate sources (7-point)
Negative—Positive
Does not care about me—Cares about me
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Not credible—Credible
Biased—Unbiased
Bad—Good
Untrustworthy--Trustworthy
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Perceived Risk (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Wagner Laboratory site poses negative impacts to human health.
Living near the Wagner Laboratory site is risky.
I would not be concerned about the contamination of the Wagner Laboratory site. (Rev)
Contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site is harming the environment.
It is unlikely that the local water supply will be further impacted by chemicals from the
Wagner Laboratory site. (Rev)
6. If nothing is done about the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site, bad things
will happen.
7. The threat from contamination of the Wagner Laboratory site will extend to future
generations.
Support for Risk Management (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to effectively manage the
contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
2. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide the best available
information on the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
3. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide me with truthful
information about the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
4. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide me with timely
information the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
5. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to make wise decisions regarding the
cleanup of the Wagner Laboratory site.
Political Ideology
Here is a 7-point scale showing political affiliations that people might hold, including Democrat
(left), Independent (center), and Republican (right). Where would you place yourself on this
scale?
Democrat—Republican
Here is a 7-point sliding scale on which the political ideologies that people might hold are
arranged from extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place
yourself on this scale?
Left—Right
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Study 2 Measures
New Environmental Paradigm Scale (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the Earth can support.
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. (Rev)
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences.
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do not make the Earth unlivable. (Rev)
5. Humans are seriously abusing the environment.
6. The Earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. (Rev)
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
(Rev)
9. Despite our special abilities, humans are still subject to the laws of nature.
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. (Rev)
11. The Earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources.
12. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. (Rev)
13. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
14. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it. (Rev)
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological
catastrophe.
Need for Cognition Scale (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. (Rev)
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities (Rev)
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in
depth about something. (Rev)
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as 1 have to. (Rev)
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones (Rev)
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them (Rev)
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
1 I. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. (Rev)
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
(Rev)
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. (Rev)
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18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

Cognitive Elaboration (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
When I was reading Steve Fields’s statement on the Superfund designation, I was…
1. …attempting to analyze the issues in the message.
2. …not very attentive to the message. (Rev)
3. …deep in thought about the message.
4. …unconcerned with the message (Rev)
5. …extending a good deal of cognitive effort.
6. …distracted by other thoughts not related to the message. (Rev)
7. …not really exerting my mind. (Rev)
8. …doing my best to think about the message.
9. …reflecting on the implications of the message.
10. …resting my mind. (Rev)
11. …searching my mind in response to the message ideas.
12. …taking it easy. (Rev)
Source Evaluation - completed for both environmentalist and corporate sources (7-point)
Negative—Positive
Does not care about me—Cares about me
Not credible—Credible
Biased—Unbiased
Bad—Good
Untrustworthy--Trustworthy
Attitudes
Based on the information that you have been provided so far, please select the circle that most
closely corresponds to your own view regarding the designation of the Wagner Laboratory as a
Superfund site. (7-point)
I oppose the Superfund designation—I support the Superfund designation
Designating the Wagner Laboratory as a Superfund site is: (7-point)
Bad—Good
Dumb—Smart
Harmful—Beneficial
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Worthless—Valuable
Unwise—Wise
Support for Risk Management (7-point, Strongly Disagree-Strongly Agree)
1. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to effectively manage the
contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
2. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide the best available
information on the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
3. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide me with truthful
information about the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
4. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to provide me with timely
information the contamination from the Wagner Laboratory site.
5. I trust Wagner Aerospace Corporation management to make wise decisions regarding the
cleanup of the Wagner Laboratory site.
Political Ideology
Here is a 7-point scale showing political affiliations that people might hold, including Democrat
(left), Independent (center), and Republican (right). Where would you place yourself on this
scale?
Democrat—Republican
Here is a 7-point sliding scale on which the political ideologies that people might hold are
arranged from extremely liberal (left) to extremely conservative (right). Where would you place
yourself on this scale?
Left—Right
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